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Abstract
This thesis presents a novel account of syllogistic reasoning, based on data from
a non-standard reasoning task called the Individuals Task. An abstract logical
treatment of the system, based on a modalised Euler Circles system (Stenning &
Oberlander 1994, 1995) is presented, and it is shown that this can be implemented
in a diverse range of notationally distinct ways. The Individual Identification
Algorithm, as this method is called, makes use of a logical distinction between the
premisses of the syllogism; one has an existential, assertive role, and is called the
source premiss, whereas the function of the other is to license inference, and so
it is called the conditional premiss. This distinction is central to the way the IIA
employs modal information to make the use of Euler Circles tractable.
The empirical parts of the thesis are concerned with relating the distinction
between source and conditional premisses to the Figural Effect (Johnson-Laird &
Steedman 1978). It is argued that the Figural Effect is reducible to a tendency for
the terms from the source premiss to occur before the terms from the conditional
premiss in Individual Conclusions. Since these are comprised of all three terms
in the syllogism, it is possible to test new hypotheses concerning the role of the
middle term in inference, and the results are shown to be incompatible with all
existing theories of the Figural Effect.
Since the Individuals Task is non-standard, it is necessary to compare perfor¬
mance profiles on this task with those on the Standard Task; one result of this
comparison is that a primary cause of error in the Standard Task is selection of
an appropriate quantifier for the conclusion, a result which concurs with the con¬
clusions of Ford (1994) and Wetherick & Gilhooly (1990), but contradicts those of
Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird 1983).
Certain anomalies in the prediction of term order by the source/conditional
distinction lead to the postulation of a second process for conclusion generation,
called Minimal Linking. This logically unsound strategy has effects similar to the
illicit conversion of A premisses (Chapman &; Chapman 1959, Revlis 1975).
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1.1 The study of reasoning
The study of the psychology of reasoning began in the Twentieth Century, but
in earlier times it was a commonplace assumption that logic was the study of the
laws of thought (Henle 1962). Philosophers argued about the acceptability of a
given pattern of inference on the grounds that they did or did not habitually use
that pattern. Modern conceptions of logic have tended to reject this assumption,
often simply on the grounds that human reasoning is subject to error, but in recent
times the distinction has become blurred again. The rise of Cognitivism has led
researchers to consider the possibility of a "mental logic" or a logic which captures
the patterns of human inference. The development of non-classical logics such as
Fuzzy Logic and Relevant Logic is at least partly concerned with the question
whether these variants more accurately capture human intuitions of valid inference
(see Read 1988 for an introduction to non-classical logic).
Perhaps it would be reasonable to claim that in the early stages of the develop¬
ment of a logical system, the justification for that system is its relevance to human
inference; when that logic becomes adequately formalised, it seems to "look after
itself" (Wittgenstein 1922). Of course, logics can also be used in a normative
fashion, as a benchmark against which fallible human reasoning can be judged.
The psychological study of reasoning typically lives in the gaps. There is
ongoing controversy about the rationality of human reasoning. Some researchers
(e.g Woodworth & Sells 1935) have assumed that human performance on logical
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problems can be characterised as essentially irrational, whereas many more recent
approaches (Guyote & Sternberg 1981, Johnson-Laird 1983) characterise human
reasoning as essentially rational. In the former case, there is a need to account
for the possibility of rational performance, whereas in the latter case, much of the
research effort seeks to explain why people make errors.
Understanding why people reason as they do is a worthwhile activity—if we
know what people find difficult, and why, it may be possible to take remedial steps.
Obviously there could be applications to education, particularly in formal subjects
such as mathematics. For example, a recent research program has been studying
the use of heterogeneous reasoning systems in the teaching of logic (Stenning, Cox
& Oberlander 1995). The psychology of reasoning holds out the possibility of a
rigorous theoretical treatment via the tools of logic in a subject (psychology) where
theory is often little more than a set of empirical rules of thumb or, conversely, is
expressed at such a high level that little or no empirical test is possible.
Psychology has typically been concerned with only a few paradigms of reason¬
ing. There has been a considerable amount of research on conditional reasoning
(Wason 1966, Cosmides 1989) and three-term series problems (Hunter 1957), but
perhaps the largest literature concerns categorical syllogisms. Syllogisms have cer¬
tain methodological advantages over other problem types: they produce several
robust psychological effects, and since there is only a small finite set of distinct
syllogisms, constituting a complete, integrated system, it is easy to compare the
results of different studies without sacrificing generality.
The fact that the syllogism was the first branch of logic to be developed suggests
that it is of special importance. It deals with a class of inferences concerned
with inheritance, so it is fundamental to taxonomy. Since Cantor this role has
been supplanted by set theory, but for some 2000 years it was considered one of
the main sets of schemata of valid argument; while for most of that time this
view was not under serious attack, its durability is a testament to its perceived
utility. It is logically interesting because its semantics are expressible in graphical
systems of very limited expressive power (Stenning & Oberlander 1994, 1995).
This thesis makes the case that a class of algorithms constructed on this basis can




12 3 4 1 2 3 4
Premiss 1 a-b b-a a-b b-a Major Premiss M-P P-M M-P P-M
Premiss 2 b-c c-b c-b b-c Minor Premiss S-M S-M M-S M-S
Conclusion S-P S-P S-P S-P
Figure 1.1: Two classifications of Figure.
1.2 Definitions
Before reviewing the syllogistic reasoning literature, it is helpful to define a number
of common terms, since there is no standard usage of certain of these in the
literature.
A syllogism consists of two premisses, each of which relate two terms. One of
the terms (the middle term) occurs in both premisses, while the other two (the
end terms) each occur in only one premiss. There are 4 moods or premiss types,
with the quantifiers (and conventional mnemonics) "all" (A), "some" (I), "none"
(E) and "some... not" (O).
The other degree of freedom is in the arrangement of terms, known as Figure.
Unfortunately, in the literature there are two different definitions of Figure: the
Scholastic classification, which specifies the positions of terms in both the pre¬
misses and the conclusion, and a variant most closely associated with the work
of Johnson-Laird (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983), which specifies only the position of
terms in the premisses. Figure 1.1 shows both possibilities. While at first it
may appear that the only consequential difference is in the numbering, in fact
the Scholastic version's specification of the order of end terms in the conclusion
rules out of consideration half of the possible forms of the syllogism. This has the
consequence of obscuring the Figural Effect, which is one of the main topics of
this thesis (see Chapter 4), so I follow Johnson-Laird's classification.
Since each premiss can be in one of four moods, and each premiss pair can have
one of four Figures, there are 4 x 4 x 4 = 64 different premiss pairs. I normally
use the word "syllogism" to refer to premiss pairs of this type.
In the text I sometimes use the expressions "stronger premiss" and "weaker
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premiss"; this refers to the amount that is implied by the premisses, or their
relative informativeness. A strong premiss has many consequences, whereas a
weak one has few. Practically in the case of the syllogism, Universals are strong,
since they imply more, and Particulars are weak, since they imply less.
1.3 The History of the Syllogism
The syllogism was the first branch of logic to be developed, by Aristotle (384-322
BCE), who claimed he invented it all on his own, without precursors (Aristotle
336 BCE/1983). Apparently there is no historical evidence to contradict this.
Aristotle also provided a complete proof theory, which proceeded by reducing the
various valid moods of the syllogism to the valid moods in the first Figure, which
he assumed to be self-evident, although he appears to have been aware that this
was only one of many possible ways of formalising the system. The magnitude
of Aristotle's intellectual leap is underscored by the fact that not only did he
invent logic, but in so doing made the first documented use of variables in the
history of science. The work was refined but not significantly advanced upon by
his successors in the Peripatetic School, most notably Theophrastus (circa 372-288
BCE). Other Ancient Greek schools did produce significant developments in other
branches of logic however, particularly the Stoics, who developed systems of sen¬
tential reasoning and whose most famous and innovative member was Chrysippus
(280-205 BCE) (Mates 1972).
Despite the popular image of syllogising Mediaeval monks, very little of sub¬
stance was contributed to logic as such, as opposed to the philosophy of lan¬
guage, during the Middle Ages, and students of logic concentrated on preservation
and transmission of the doctrines of antiquity, constructing summulae (little sum¬
maries) of ancient logic. According to Johnson-Laird (1983), the idea of a 'sieve'
to catch only valid syllogisms by application of a few rules is attributable to the
Mediaeval Scholastics. Five rules are sufficient (reproduced from Johnson-Laird
1983):
1. If both premisses are affirmative, then the conclusion is affirmative.
2. If one premiss is negative, then the conclusion is negative.
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3. If both premisses are negative, then there is no valid conclusion.
4. The middle term must be distributed in at least one premiss.
5. No term may be distributed in the conclusion if it is not distributed in the
premiss in which it occurs.
A term is said to be distributed in a statement if the entire class of entities to
which it refers must be considered in order to determine if the statement is true.
The summulae have contributed to some extent to classification schemes; for
example, the names by which the Aristotelian moods of the syllogism have come
to be known (Barbara, Celarent etc) are apparently due to William of Shyreswood
(d. 1249), who used them to compose a mnemonic poem. These names cunningly
encode information about mood, Figure and even the method of conversion by
means of spelling, so that barbara denotes a syllogism with two A premisses and
an A conclusion in the first Figure. The vowels indicate the moods of the premisses
and conclusion in order, and the consonants give instructions for reducing the given
mood to the first four (Mates 1972).
The method of Euler Circles, which informs much of the work in this thesis, is
often attributed to Leonhard Euler, the eighteenth century mathematician, who
used it to teach logic to a German princess (Euler 1772). However, the technique
was in fact originated by Leibniz (1666), the brilliant polymath who, sadly, has
tended not to get due credit for his innovations.
1.4 The psychology of syllogisms
1.4.1 Early work
Before the 1970s, much research concentrated on the explanation of error in syl¬
logistic reasoning. There is a substantial literature on the influence of real world
knowledge, beliefs and attitudes on subjects' acceptance of either valid or invalid
conclusions (Janis & Frick 1943; Evans et al 1983; Oakhill et al 1989; Newstead
et al 1992).
Another approach was to construct unsound inference schemata, the best
known of which is the Atmosphere Effect (Woodworth & Sells 1935, Sells 1936).
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The Atmosphere Effect Hypothesis postulates that subjects use a few simple rules
to assess the validity of conclusions, so that if the premisses are, say, universal and
positive, the conclusion will also be universal and positive. Thus the premisses
create an "atmosphere", and conclusions are assumed to be valid if they match this
atmosphere. Since this scheme corresponds to part of the "Sieve" decision pro¬
cedure mentioned above, many of the conclusions predicted by the Atmosphere
Hypothesis are in fact valid ones. Early versions of the theory were unsatisfactory,
since the hypothesis was vaguely formulated, and predictions were tested on a
small subset of invalid conclusions, but subsequent researchers (eg Revlis 1975)
refined the theory to the stage where it constituted a precisely-specified cognitive
procedure, and tested it on a much wider set of data, including valid conclusions.
Unfortunately, although the Atmosphere Effect did account for subjects' conclu¬
sions quite well, its fit with the data was found to be substantially better for
valid conclusions than invalid ones, suggesting that its apparently high degree of
confirmation was spurious (Revlis 1975).
Whatever the empirical evidence, the Atmosphere Effect Hypothesis cannot
entirely account for human reasoning, if only because it cannot explain valid rea¬
soning in cases where the valid conclusion does not match the atmosphere of the
premisses. Moreover, it never predicts a "No Valid Conclusion" response, while
subjects often correctly find these. It would need to be supplemented by some sort
of valid reasoning process to accommodate subjects' potential rationality, which
on the basis of the above findings, would undermine much of the evidence for it.
Other early researchers (e.g. Henle 1962, Ceraso & Provitera 1971) were more
alert to the need to give an account of rational reasoning. Although they still
omitted to specify the means by which inferences might be drawn, they argued
that apparently invalid conclusions could be explained as the valid consequences
of non-standard interpretations of premisses. Henle (1962) argued that inferences
frequently appear as enthymemes, or incompletely stated syllogisms, and that
once the full set of premisses actually assumed by the subject was known, the
inferences drawn would be seen to be valid ones. Ceraso & Provitera (1971) showed
that by giving more specific interpretations of premisses, subjects' performance
improved to near-perfection, but acknowledged that their task was not equivalent
to the syllogistic reasoning task, precisely because they had removed the inherent
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ambiguity of syllogistic premisses, which is a contributory factor to the difficulty
of syllogistic inference.
Similarly, Chapman & Chapman (1959) argued that many errors can be at¬
tributed to the illicit conversion of A and O premisses, so that given "All As are
Bs", subjects may assume "All Bs are As". Such conversion is perfectly legitimate
for I and E premisses, since the truth conditions for the unconverted and converted
forms are the same, but A and 0 premisses are not validly convertible, and con¬
version of these can sometimes lead to errors. Early tests of this hypothesis were
equivocal about its usefulness as an explanation of errors (Begg & Denny 1969,
Revlis 1975) since many of its predictions were the same as those of the Atmo¬
sphere Effect hypothesis, but if the latter is discounted, the Conversion Hypothesis
appears more viable in retrospect.
1.4.2 Model-theoretic approaches
The increasing influence of cognitive psychology led to a substantial change of
emphasis in the mid-1970s, resulting in greater awareness of the need to account
for valid inference. At the same time, the wider availability of computers made it
easier both to develop and to test much more intricate models of reasoning pro¬
cesses. Most theories from that period up to the present draw on logical model
theory, making the assumption that subjects solve syllogisms by consideration of
'
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the space of possible logical models of the premisses. This allows for the poten¬
tial rationality of subjects' reasoning processes, by basing these on sound logical
principles. The two main threads of research in this tradition are based on the
so-called Method of Euler Circles and the theory of Mental Models.
The use of the so-called method of Euler Circles in the syllogistic reasoning
literature is most commonly associated with the work of Erickson (1974, 1978)
and Guyote & Sternberg (1981). The idea is that each premiss can be represented
by a set of diagrams which represent alternative models of the premisses, or dif¬
ferent "possible worlds" in which the premisses are made true in different ways
compatible with their meaning.
For example, there are two different situations compatible with the premiss
"All of the Artists are Beekeepers". The Euler Circle representations are given in
Figure 1.2. The first shows the situation where every Artist is a Beekeeper, and
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Figure 1.2: Representing the premiss "All of the Artists are Beekeepers" with
primitively interpreted Euler Circles
every Beekeeper is an Artist, while the second shows the situation where every
Artist is a Beekeeper, but some of the Beekeepers are not Artists. A third possi¬
bility, commonly accepted in modern logic, is that there are no Artists, and the
generalisation holds because there are no counterexamples in the form of Artists
who are not Beekeepers; however in the conventional interpretation of the syllo¬
gism, all terms are assumed to be instantiated, so we do not need to consider the
possibility.
It is clear then that, in this notation, each diagram represents an interpreta¬
tion of the premiss or "possible world", and each bounded region within a diagram
represents a type of individual which exists in that possible world. The truth con¬
ditions or each premiss type can be expressed by a set of between one and four
diagrams standing in 1-1 correspondence with distinct logical interpretations. Geo¬
metrical properties of the diagrams are unimportant, only topological relationships
(patterns of overlap, inclusion and non-overlap) are significant in interpretation.
Ideally, reasoning is assumed to proceed by creating compound diagrams for
each possible combination of two diagrams, one for each premiss. Conclusions are
checked against all the resulting diagrams, and only those potential conclusions
which hold in all of them are accepted as valid. Unfortunately, the resulting set
of possibilities can be rather large, to the extent that it is implausible that hu¬
man reasoners could keep track of them all individually in working memory. Also,
the number of diagrams required to solve a problem does not correlate with its
observed difficulty—some problems with many possible combinations are solved
relatively easily and quickly, whereas other problems, with fewer Eulerian combi¬
nations, are much more difficult (Johnson-Laird & Bara 1984).
Ironically, Erickson's solution to the problem of the combinatorial explosion
was to suggest that perhaps subjects constructed only one combination diagram,
thus rescuing the irrationality of the subject. However, subsequent researchers
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All A B Some A B None A B Some A not B
Figure 1.3: Mental Models representations for each premiss type.
have adopted a different strategy, indroducing modal distinctions into representa¬
tions, to reduce the required number of premiss representations to one per premiss
without compromising the soundness or completeness of the system. Johnson-
Laird's Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird & Steedman 1978, Johnson-Laird
(1983), Johnson-Laird & Bara 1984, Byrne & Johnson-Laird 1991) marks the
distinction between necessary and possible individuals explicitly in the represen¬
tation. As a consequence, the number of combined representations is reduced to
between one and three. The theory has changed significantly over the years, but
probably the best-known version is that presented in Johnson-Laird (1983) and
Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984).
This theory assumes that premisses are represented by arrays of tokens cor¬
responding to the terms of the syllogism: Figure 1.3 shows the Mental Models
representations for the four premiss types. These tokens may represent optional
or necessary instances of their referents; optional tokens are bracketed, whereas
necessary ones are unbracketed. Rows of tokens represent individuals, and since
numbers of any type of individual are insignificant to interpretation, they may
be replicated at will. The horizontal lines in the negative cases represent barriers
'fencing off' sets of rows from each other—effectively these restrict the locations
where new replicated rows may be added, so that it is impossible to replicate a
row across a barrier.
Syllogistic inference is held to consist in integrating the two models and read¬
ing off a conclusion. Some pairs of models admit being integrated in only one
way, whereas others may have two or three different integrations. This prop¬
erty, the number of distinct integrated models, is used by Johnson-Laird and his
coworkers to explain the differential difficulty of syllogisms. Empirically, the cru-
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Figure 1.4: Mental Models Theory: examples of a single-model problem (above)
and a multiple-model problem (below) (adapted from Johnson-Laird 1983)
cial difference appears to be between 'single-model' problems and 'multiple-model'
problems; the early three-way distinction has been dropped in a recent version of
the theory (Byrne & Johnson-Laird 1991), since the number of models assumed to
be needed for a given premiss pair is implementation-dependent (Johnson-Laird &
Bara 1984). Figure 1.4 shows examples of single-model and multiple-model prob¬
lems. In the first example, it is impossible to modify the initial model in such a
way as to refute either of the putative conclusions, so it is a single-model problem;
in the second, two models can be constructed, both supporting the conclusion
Some of the As are not Cs, but one of which supports another conclusion, Some
of the Cs are not As.
The Byrne & Johnson-Laird (1991) version of the theory uses a different style
of representation which employs square brackets to mark terms which have been
exhaustively represented ('distributed terms' in the Scholastic terminology), and
omits to specify optional elements in initial representations, allowing them to be
added later, but the authors do not seem to believe that this difference has many
empirical consequences different from the earlier formulations. There is a large
literature on the Mental Models theory, which I cannot summarise here; however
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Chapter 4 covers a number of points specifically related to the Mental Models
account of the Figural Effect.
Johnson-Laird (1983) argues that the discrete nature of Mental Models repre¬
sentations renders them more realistic than Euler Circles, since the latter use a
continuous space to represent a set of objects, but as we have seen, such geomet¬
rical properties of Euler Circles are irrelevant to their interpretation. Since the
syllogism is a subset of Monadic Predicate Calculus without identity, numbers of
a type of individual can never be significant (see Section 3.1 in Chapter 3 for more
discussion of this point). Stenning & Oberlander (1994, 1995) argue that in fact
Mental Models theory is a notational variant of a modalised Euler Circles system.
Essentially the same system is presented in this thesis, in Section 3.3.1, and it can
be demonstrated that no more than one combined diagram need be constructed
for any premiss pair, without compromising the completeness of the system, and
hence subjects' potential rationality. Recently, Ford (1994) has also developed a
modalised Euler Circles system, though the details of premiss combination have
not been made explicit.
In these model-theoretic approaches, there are two main ways to accommodate
reasoning errors: premisses may be misinterpreted, or the full set of combinations
of premiss representations may not be tested. The latter option is favoured by
Johnson-Laird, whereas the former is more directly compatible with theories of
Conversion and Gricean errors, and the rationalist approach mentioned earlier.
Newstead (1989, 1990) has reported experiments on premiss interpretation
using an Euler Circle task and an immediate inference task. In the Euler Circles
task, subjects selected primitively (non-modally) interpreted Euler Circle diagrams
corresponding to interpretations of a given premiss, and in the immediate inference
task, subjects indicated whether or not selected statements were entailed by a
given premiss. The results showed a clear tendency to convert A premisses in both
tasks, but not O ones, and there was a small tendency to commit Gricean "errors"
(Grice 1975). Subjects assessed as A-converters on the immediate inference task
made more errors predicted by conversion theory on a syllogistic reasoning task,
but the results of the Euler Circles task did not correlate with the results of
the immediate inference task, and so the validity of the measures was put in
question. Stenning & Cox (1995) argue that Newstead's immediate inference task
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was logically incoherent, and modified it to permit "Don't know" responses, in
order to accommodate the three possible logical relations between statements:
entailment, contradiction and logical independence. Their results showed, contra
Newstead, that subjects who made A-conversion errors in the Euler Circles task
did also tend to make A-conversion errors as assessed by the amended immediate
inference task. This rectifies the validity problem, making possible a genuine test
of the relation between premiss misinterpretation and reasoning errors, but at
present the necessary experiments have not yet been completed.
1.4.3 Hybrid theories
While Mental Models theory has enjoyed wide distribution and acceptance in
the Cognitive Science community, owing to its descriptive success and relative
plausibility, recently several alternative accounts have been proposed. These share
a dissatisfaction with the tacit assumption that a single model can usefully be
applied to a diverse population of subjects.
As I have mentioned already, Ford (1994) asked subjects to explain their con¬
clusions in a syllogistic reasoning task, and found that almost all subjects could
be classified as either verbal or graphical reasoners. Verbal reasoners typically
explained their conclusions with reference to the substitution of terms from a uni¬
versal premiss into the other premiss, whereas graphical reasoners drew diagrams
using geometrical shapes, such as circles or squares, depicting set relations. It
was found that the two groups showed different error patterns and response biases
consistent with reasonable assumptions about how such methods could work.
Wetherick & Gilhooly (1990) argue that a substantial proportion of subjects
can be shown to follow a non-logical strategy which they call "Matching". This
is related to the Atmosphere Effect, except simpler. Matching subjects simply
produce conclusions with the same quantifier as the weaker premiss; this often
produces a valid conclusion, but leads to predictable error patterns. Subjects
assessed as Matchers on problems without valid conclusions were shown to have
good performance on problems whose valid conclusions were derivable by Match¬
ing, and poor performance on problems whose valid conclusions were not (i.e.
problems whose valid conclusion was not in the same mood as either premiss),
whereas the remainder of subjects showed no such effects, and it could be argued
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that they were following a "logical" strategy.
The account of syllogistic reasoning which is described in this thesis shares
some features with both of the above accounts; it is consistent with the idea
that "logical" reasoning can be implemented in a variety of phenomenologically
distinct ways, but concedes that some error patterns are best explained by a
logically unsound strategy. Much of the empirical content is concerned with the
explanation of the Figural Effect (Johnson-Laird & Steedman 1978), which is
discussed in depth in Chapter 4.
1.5 Historical overview of thesis
My own interest in the psychology of syllogisms was stimulated by reading "Mental
Models" (Johnson-Laird 1983) as an undergraduate. But I was dissatisfied by the
explanation of the Figural Effect, and felt that the true explanation was that the
Figural Effect was a consequence of the logic of the problems rather than of the
putative memory systems that were supposed to underlie reasoning.
When I encountered Keith Stennings's work on modalised Euler Circles and the
Individuals Task, I was able to work on the subject for my MSc thesis (Yule 1991),
which concentrated on the explanation of error in the Individuals Task. At that
time, the modalised Euler Circles system was based on a "shading cancellation"
algorithm, and as such was neither sound nor complete. The technique of using
only the maximal registration diagram (see Chapter 3) was my own innovation,
stimulated by the need to construct a computerised scoring system for individual
conclusions. The prolog implementation in Chapter 3 was developed from the
core of this system, and this optimisation of the graphical method was adopted
by Stenning & Oberlander (1995). Having gained this crucial insight, the abstract
Individual Identification Algorithm and Modal Predicate Calculus implementation
were straightforwardly constructed on the same principle.
As a further testament to the usefulness of computer modelling, after finishing
my MSc thesis I was struck by the similarity between the ordered term structures
generated by the program and the human data from the Individuals Task exper¬
iment. This is the origin of the hypothesis that the distinction between source
and conditional premisses might account for term order, and consequently the
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Figural Effect. Early results, reported in Chapter 5 suggested that the association
between the source/conditional distinction and end-term order was worth further
investigation.
It was necessary to learn the technique of loglinear modelling to attempt to
evaluate the claim that the source/conditional distinction could account for the
Figural Effect. Early models, using only valid conclusions with unique source
premisses, failed to abolish the main effect of Figure, but with the inclusion of an
early version of what came to be known as the A-effect, the Figural Effect was
successfully abolished for valid conclusions. Further refinement in the definition
of variables, involving defining the source and A-effect variables with three levels
(first, second and both/neither), made it possible to construct a model which
included all valid and invalid conclusions, and demonstrated that the total (valid
and invalid) figural effect could be abolished. This is the end-term model described
in Chapter 6.
The recognition of the importance of the A-Effect in the Individuals Task
raised the question whether it could also be identified in Standard Task datasets.
The models in Chapter 7 are the results of this investigation and show that the
phenomenon does appear to extend to the Standard Task, ffowever, the question
of the degree of psychological similarity between the Individuals and Standard
Tasks was still open to analysis in terms of problem difficulty, prompting the
comparative analysis in Chapter 5.
Having gained a reasonable amount of experience in modelling, I was able to
experiment with models of three-term order in the Individuals Task. The three-
term model in Chapter 6 is the state of the art, but I would like to have been able
to experiment for longer, since the space of possibilities in the case of three terms
is larger than in the case when only the end terms need be considered.
After establishing the existence and robustness of the A-effect in purely em¬
pirical terms, it remained for me to try to find an explanation for it. Work on
the comparative problem difficulty analysis led me to reconsider my MSc thesis
results, which suggested that the commonest types of error individuals appeared
to have their origin in a strategy based on the unification of critical individuals.





A variety of experiments are referred to in the course of this thesis. For conve¬
nience, these experiments are described here.
2.1 The Levy (1984) Experiment
This experiment was run by Joe Levy in Cambridge in 1984, under the supervision
of P.N. Johnson-Laird, for an undergraduate thesis. Since it remains unpublished,
it is described in detail here.
Design Subjects were divided into 4 groups, each group receiving problems from a
different Figure. They received all 16 problems in their assigned Figure, once in each of
two blocks of trials corresponding to single- and double-premiss presentation modes. The
order of presentation of blocks was counterbalanced between subjects, to avoid learning
effects and permit a repeated measures comparison of presentation types, and problems
were presented in a pseudorandom order within blocks. Subjects could respond with
any of the 8 quantified conclusion types (4 quantifiers (all, some, none, some... not) x
2 end-term orders (ac or ca)], or 'No Valid Conclusion'.
Each subject also produced two memory-test scores, one for each of the 2+2 and
3+3 tests, both measured as the number of strings transformed in one minute.
Subjects 40 unpaid volunteers, mostly undergraduate students.
Materials Syllogisms were presented on a BBC model B microcomputer, which pre¬
sented problems and collected responses in both presentation modes. In double-premiss
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mode, both premisses appeared onscreen together, while in single-premiss mode, pre¬
misses appeared singly, the second replacing the first onscreen in response to subjects'
keypresses.
Syllogisms were constructed using terms from each of three word cohorts, denoting
hobbies, interests and occupations. Word triplets were shuffled so that cohorts were not
associated with term types.
Procedure Subjects were given instructions and four practice trials before each block
of problems. They were instructed to imagine that the premisses described a group of
people in a room, and to draw conclusions relating the end terms, which had to be true
of the people in the room given that the premisses were. The practice trials consisted
of two three-term series, a syllogism and a syllogism with a numerical quantifier, in
order to give the flavour of the problems without unduly affecting subjects' syllogistic
performance. The syllogisms followed immediately, then the procedure was repeated for
the second block of problems.
After the syllogisms the subjects were given two short memory tests and a question¬
naire. The memory tests were similar to those reported by Hamilton et al (1977) and
were intended to give a measure of the processing capacity of working memory. The
tests, known as the 2+2 and 3+3 tests, involved transforming a string of letters into
another by counting upwards a number of alphabetic places, so that the 2+2 test en¬
tailed transforming two letters by two places (e.g. CP -+ ER), and the 3+3 test entailed
transforming three letters by three places (e.g. HQB —> KTE). In each test, subjects
were given one minute to transform as many strings as possible. The questionnaire was
intended to elicit introspective reports of subjects' solution strategies.
Overall session lengths ranged from 40 to 65 minutes.
2.2 Individuals Task Experiment
The Individuals Task experiment was designed and run by Cath Ardin in 1991,
with assistance from myself and Morten Christiansen. Some results have been
reported in Ardin (1991) and Yule (1991); however the analyses reported here are
original.
Design Subjects produced descriptions of necessary individuals for each of the 64
syllogisms presented in random order. Subjects could respond with any of 48 different
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individual conclusions [8 distinct individual types (+++, ++-, +-+, H—, -++, -+-
, —f, —) x 6 distinct term orders (ABC, BAC, ACB, CBA, BCA, CAB)], or 'No
Valid Conclusion'. Each subject received materials with one of two different random
assignments of vocabulary to problems.
Subjects 22 Edinburgh University students took part. None had any prior training
in syllogistic logic.
Materials Each subject received a set of 64 slips of paper, on each of which was
printed a different pair of premisses. The vocabulary used was selected from sets of nouns
denoting nationalities, professions and interests, for example None of the musicians are
chessplayers. All of the musicians are Italians. Each vocabulary item appeared in two
syllogisms, and two different random assignments of vocabulary to syllogisms were used.
Procedure Subjects were instructed to imagine that the premisses on each slip of
paper described a group of people at a party. They were instructed to assume that some
people corresponding to each of the three terms existed.
Subjects were instructed to decide whether any kind of person who could be described
with certainty, in terms of either positive or negative values of all three features, had to
be present in the room, and to describe the individual on the slip of paper, or if there
was no such individual, to write "No valid conclusion".
Subjects worked individually in quiet surroundings, and were given as much time as
they needed to finish all the problems.
2.3 Durham Standard Task Experiment
This experiment was designed and prepared by myself, and run with the assistance
of Rosemary Stevenson in Durham during 1992.
Design Separate groups of subjects received Contentful and Contentless materials
sets, and each materials set presented all 64 syllogisms in random order, each using a
different random assignment of vocabulary to problems. Subjects could respond with
any of the 8 quantified conclusion types (4 quantifiers (all, some, none, some... not) x
2 end-term orders (ac or ca)], or 'No Valid Conclusion'.
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Subjects 24 Durham University students took part. None had any prior training in
syllogistic logic.
Materials Each subject received a set of 64 slips of paper, on each of which was
printed a different pair of premisses.
In the Contentful condition, the vocabulary used for the terms was selected from
sets of nouns denoting nationalities, professions and interests, for example None of
the musicians are chessplayers. All of the musicians are Italians. In the Contentless
condition, the vocabulary used for the terms was selected from three cohorts of capital
letters, for example None of the Ms are Cs. All of the Ms are Is. In both conditions,
each vocabulary item appeared in two syllogisms, and assignments of vocabulary to
syllogisms were randomised.
The vocabulary used in the Contentful condition was the same as that used in the
Individuals Experiment.
Procedure Subjects were instructed to imagine that the premisses on each slip of
paper described a group of people at a party. They were instructed to assume that some
people corresponding to each of the three terms existed.
Subjects were instructed to decide whether there was any statement relating the
end terms of the premisses which must hold of the people in the room, and to write the
statement on the slip of paper, or if there was no such statement, to write "No valid
conclusion".
Subjects worked individually in one large group, and were given as much time as
they needed to finish all the problems.
2.4 The Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) Experi¬
ments
The two datasets reanalysed here are from experiments 1 and 3 in Johnson-Laird &
Bara (1984). The details are published, and so not repeated here, but in summary,
in experiment 1 subjects performed the Standard Task and were required to re¬
spond within 10s, whereas in experiment 3 subjects again performed the Standard
Task but with no time restriction.
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Chapter 3
The Logic of the Syllogism
3.1 Model Theory
Semantics The syllogism can be viewed as a fragment of the monadic (one-
placed) predicate calculus. Because the monadic calculus has no identity relation
(it lacks relational predicates entirely), its semantics concerns types of individuals
defined by combinations of properties. Since there is no way to express identity
or distinctness, there is no way to discriminate between individuals with the same
properties; therefore it is never of semantic significance how many of a type of
individual exist.
We define Maximal types as combinations of all three predicates of a syllo¬
gism. There are eight such types: ABC, AB->C, A-iBC,A-iB-iC, ->ABC, -1AB-1C,
-■A-iBC, and -1A-1B-1C. Interpretations of the syllogism consist of sets of these
maximal types of individual. Conventionally, the syllogism is interpreted under
the assumption that none of the three sets A, B and C are empty. Subjects nat¬
urally adopt this assumption1. This 'no-empty-sets' axiom reduces the number of
possible models somewhat (Stenning & Oberlander 1994, 1995).
Inferential Structure Of the 64 syllogisms 27 have conventionally valid con¬
clusions which can be formulated by applying one of the four quantifiers to the
xAs witnessed for example by their readiness in the task situation to conclude from All A
are B that Some A are B - see Stenning, Cox & Oberlander (1995), Newstead (1989, 1990) for
discussion of 'immediate inference' tasks
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two end terms. The remaining 37 syllogisms do not allow any valid conclusions
within the vocabulary of conclusions thus specified, though as we will see, there
is another group which allow valid conclusions if a further quantifier is available.
Examination of the valid syllogisms reveals that all syllogisms which have valid
conclusions entail the existence of at least one maximal type of individual. So, for
example, Some B are -<A. All B are C. entails that there are individuals of the
maximal type -"ABC (and therefore that Some C are not A). There is obviously a
direct relation between the entailment of the existence of maximal types and the
entailment of existential conclusions.
Considering the converse of this generalisation is revealing. It turns out that
for all but one small group of syllogisms, if they entail the existence of a maximal
type, they also have a valid conventional conclusion. The exceptions are a group
of syllogisms with two negative premisses (according to the "sieve" decision proce¬
dure given in the Introduction, two negative premisses have no valid conclusion).
For example, No A are B. No B are C establishes that there are -^AB-^C individ¬
uals. The quantificational apparatus of the conventional syllogism will not allow
expression of the conclusion Some ->A are -1 C (these can be called 'U' conclusions
following the common notation of the four conventional quantifiers). Stenning &
Oberlander use the expression "case-identifiability" to describe the property that
any valid conclusion depends crucially on the existence of only one individual, as
in the conventional syllogism.
These model-theoretic properties of the syllogism are highly unusual. Even
other small finite logical fragments (such as disjunctive syllogisms, for example A
or B. Not A. Therefore, B) are generally not case-identifiable. Case-identifiability
plays a crucial role in determining what representations and algorithms can be em¬
ployed on this fragment of logic; in particular, it makes the syllogism susceptible to
a graphical strategy. There is no need to represent partially specified individuals
in the diagrammatic representation of the conjunction of two premisses (Stenning
& Oberlander 1995). Having an efficient graphical strategy which need construct
only one diagram per syllogism is further dependent on the even stronger prop¬
erty that the maximal model for any syllogism is unique, and consists of all the
individuals consistent with the premisses (i.e. there are no contingencies between
the presence/absence of types in a model). For more on the graphical strategy,
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see Section 3.3.1 below.
3.2 Solving syllogisms by identifying critical in¬
dividuals
The aim of this section is to describe an abstract algorithm for syllogistic reason¬
ing, the IIA. Initially, this algorithm is specified in model-theoretic terms. The
algorithm turns on the identification of critical individuals, individuals whose ex¬
istence is necessitated by the premisses, which form a basis for the formulation of
quantified conclusions. The Abstract Individual Identification Algorithm can be
implemented in a variety of superficially quite different ways, which are described
in the remaining sections of this chapter. The aim is to reveal commonalities
between what have been taken to be distinct processes (graphical methods, rule
based methods and computer program implementations) defining opposing psy¬
chological theories of reasoning.
Premiss representation The meaning of premisses is represented in terms of
sets of individuals which satisfy them. Model-theoretically, each premiss type is
satisfiable by any of several different sets of individual types. However, the present
method needs to make use of only two of these sets for each premiss, these being the
set of possible individuals whose existence is consistent with the premiss, known
as the maximal model (Max), and the set of individuals whose existence is entailed
by the premiss, known as the minimal model (Min). These are respectively the
largest and smallest sets of types compatible with the premiss. The representation
can thus be characterised as the ordered pair < Max, Min >. Since Min C Max,
it is feasible to represent each premiss type using a single integrated representation
with individuals marked as necessary or possible (cf. Mental Models).
Types of individuals are notated by feature structures, where features are con¬
structed from the terms appearing in the premisses of the syllogism, prefixed by
"+" or ", which indicate whether the individual concerned is or is not a member
of the set denoted by the term. For example "+P+Q", denotes a type of individ¬
ual which is P and is Q, i.e. (3x)(Px&Qx). Similarly, "+Q—R" denotes a type
of individual which is Q and is not R, i.e. (3x)(Qx&i^Rx). Feature structures are
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unordered owing to the commutativity and associativity of conjunction.
Case Identification Case identification depends on the integration of informa¬
tion from both premisses. The aim is to identify the minimal model of the premiss
pair, the set of feature structures which are specified with respect to all three terms
in the problem, which denote those individuals whose existence is entailed by the
premisses taken together. This can be achieved using unification, an operation
which takes two feature structures and returns a third which is their set-union,
provided the two do not contain different values for any of their members (see
Shieber 1986 for an introduction to unification). So, for example, the unification
of +A-1-B with +B—C is +A+B—C, but the unification of -t-A+B with —B—C is
undefined, since the two do not have the same values for the B feature.
Given two premisses' characteristic representations, the set of all unifications of
each member of one maximal model with each member of the other maximal model
(the Cartesian product of the two sets) is the maximal model of the premiss pair,
containing all types compatible with the premisses. Finding the minimal model for
the premiss pair turns on unifying members of the minimal model of one premiss
(critical individuals) with members of the maximal model of the other premiss.
We attempt to unify each critical individual i from one of the premisses (P) with
all the members j of the maximal model of the other premiss (Q). If only one
such unification is possible for some i, then the feature structure which is formed
must denote a member of the minimal model of the premiss pair, because it is the
only possible completion of a type which itself must exist. For example, supposing
i is +A+B and j G {+B+C,—B+C,—B—C} (the maximal model of "All the Bs
are Cs"), the only possible unification is +A+B+C. We know that +A+B must
exist, and since +A+B—C is impossible, it follows that +A-I-B+C must exist. We
call the premiss P, which supplies the critical individual i, the Source premiss,
and since the other premiss Q is always a universal (see below), we will refer to
it as the conditional premiss—this distinction has consequences in the empirical
investigation in later chapters.
If every critical individual from both premisses has been tested but no necessary
individuals have been found, then the syllogism has no valid conclusion relating
the end terms.
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Informally, the abstract IIA can be justified as follows: the critical individual
denotes an individual, specified with respect to two properties, whose existence is
entailed by the truth of the source premiss. We know a priori that this individual
either does or does not have some third property mentioned in the conditional
premiss, and the maximal model of the conditional premiss constrains the set
of such possible completions, by virtue of the shared middle term. If the set
of possible completions is constrained to one, then that individual must exist,
since the other a priori possibility has been ruled out; in other words, the critical
individual, which we know to exist, must have the specified value (whatever that is)
for the third property, because if it didn't, then its existence would be incompatible
with the truth of the conditional premiss.
As was mentioned above, the conditional premiss is always a universal; this
is because the conditional premiss must license an inference about the critical
individual. Put another way, the conditional must be the stronger premiss, and
the source the weaker. If both premisses are particular, of course there is no valid
conclusion.
Drawing Quantified Conclusions Feature structures denoting necessary in¬
dividuals form the basis for quantified conclusions. Since these relate only the end
terms, the middle term feature can be deleted from the feature structure. Of the
remaining features, if one is positive, a conclusion with that term as subject is
warranted, since the grammar of conclusions does not permit negation in subject
position2. The sign of the remaining feature determines whether the conclusion is
positive or negative. This is all that is required for a particular conclusion, so that
given e.g. +A+B—C, we delete +B giving +A—C, the only positive term is +A
so A is the subject, and since the remaining term —C is negative, the conclusion
is "Some of the As are not Cs".
For universal conclusions, a further test is required. This can be characterised
as follows: take the subject feature, and unify it with all members of the maximal
model for the premiss pair. If only one such unification results, a universal conclu¬
sion is warranted, so in the example just given, provided the test was positive, we
2U-conclusions, which have only negative end terms, are barred by this condition - see Sten-
ning & Oberlander (1994, 1995)
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could conclude "None of the As are Cs". This test is equivalent in graphical terms
to checking that the circle labelled with the subject term is not bisected in the
registration diagram. Note, however, that this procedure can be simplified: it is
sufficient merely to check that the subject term has only one possible unification
with the maximal model of the source premiss, or in graphical terms, that the
circle labelled by the subject term is not bisected in the source premiss' character¬
istic diagram. Since we know that the critical individual has only one unification
with the maximal model of the conditional premiss, it follows that there can be
only one unification with the maximal model of the premiss pair.
3.3 Implementations of the Abstract IIA
This section describes a variety of implementations of the Abstract Individual
Identification Algorithm (HA). Despite superficial differences (a graphical method,
a computer program and a rule-based method), each implementation uses clear,
straightforward analogues of minimal and maximal models and the unification
operation, to draw individual conclusions. Consequently, each implementation
can provide a reconstruction of the distinction between source and conditional
premisses.
3.3.1 The Graphical Method
The graphical algorithm was presented in Stenning & Oberlander (1995) where it
is shown that Johnson-Laird's (e.g. 1983) 'mental models' method is an alternative
implementation of the same abstract algorithm. It is restated here for the reader's
convenience.
Premiss representation Individual types are represented as regions in a di¬
agram delineated by circles. The maximal model of a premiss is represented as
a diagram containing two circles, one for each of the terms. Regions in the dia¬
gram correspond to individual types which are compatible with the premiss (the
maximal model), while the minimal model is represented by marking with an "x"
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All As are Bs
Some As are Bs A(®B
No As are Bs A©@B
Some As are not Bs A®>
Table 3.1: Characteristic diagrams for each premiss type. Regions representing
necessary individuals are marked with a x.
the regions of this diagram which correspond to necessary individuals3. Table 3.1
shows the characteristic diagram for each premiss type. The circles are assumed to
be of variable size and position. Only their topological relationships (patterns of
containment, overlap and exclusion) are significant: This premiss representation
is a direct translation of the set-theoretic relations into graphical terms.
Case Identification A new diagram is constructed by 'registering' the two char¬
acteristic diagrams by superimposing the B circles. Depending on the problem,
the topological constraints of the graphics may be sufficient to determine the final
diagram, or there may be more than one way of doing this consistent with the pre¬
misses, as in Figure 3.1, making it a "multiple models" problem (Johnson-Laird
& Bara 1984). However in the present method only one way is chosen, namely
the one which creates the maximum number of sub-regions in the diagram. This
is achieved by overlapping the circles representing the end terms if this can be
done while remaining consistent with the premisses. The result is the registration
diagram, which represents the maximal model of the premiss pair.
Now each marked region deriving from the original characteristic diagrams will
either have been bisected by the third circle or not. The marked region represents
i, a critical individual, so it can be called a critical region. If the critical region is
bisected, then the mark is removed. The attempt to overlap the end-term circles
ensures that all possible unifications of i with each j have been attempted, so if a
critical region is not bisected, and consequently remains marked in the registration









Figure 3.1: Constructing a registration diagram for the example "All of the Bs are
As, None of the Bs are Cs". While any of the three possible registration diagrams
is consistent with the premisses, the central one is chosen since it has the largest
number of regions.
Figure 3.2: Registration diagram for the problem "All of the Bs are As, Some of
the Cs are Bs".
diagram, only one unification is possible, so it represents a critical individual.
In Figure 3.1, the only mark which occurs in all the final diagrams is the one in
the 'B' circle. The 'C' circle is bisected in the central diagram, so both —A—B+C
and +A—B+C are possible, so neither is necessary. The central diagram is the
maximal diagram, the most general case, and only the marks which occur in
maximal diagrams are guaranteed to correspond to necessary individuals. The
marked 'B' region corresponds to the necessary individual +A+B—C, and since
this region appears marked in both the characteristic diagrams, both premisses
are source premisses in this case.
Another example is shown in Figure 3.2. The registration diagram to the right
of the arrow is the maximal diagram this time, since this is the only one which
need be drawn. In this case the marked region from the first premiss, "All of the
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Bs are As" is removed, and the only one which remains in the final diagram is the
one from the second premiss, "Some of the Cs are Bs", so only the second premiss
is the source premiss and the necessary individual is +A+B+C.
Registration diagrams can form the basis for a logical classification of prob¬
lem types. The labelling of the end-term circles is immaterial, since premisses
can be reordered without affecting the logic of the problem, so the classification
abstracts over such differences. Similarly, the lack of topological distinctions be¬
tween representations of convertible premisses (e.g. No As are Bs <->• No Bs are
As) means that the classification abstracts over these differences too. Figure A.l
in Appendix A.l, shows the resulting set of 21 distinct registration diagrams, for
problems with and problems without valid conclusions. It is useful to list positive
and negative syllogisms separately.
Note that this graphical algorithm, which remains faithful to Euler's practice,
is a deterministic procedure for syllogistic reasoning. It does not suffer from the
combinatorial explosion of cases which some misinterpretations of Euler's method
exhibit.
3.3.2 Individual identification in prolog
The case of two premisses
It is quite easy to implement the Individual Identification Algorithm in the logic
programming language prolog (Clocksin & Mellish 1984). The code assumes stan¬
dard versions of the predicates member/2, nth/3 and select/3. Appendix A.2
presents a full prolog program, based on the Individual Identification code pre¬
sented in this section, and which can draw quantified as well as individual conclu¬
sions.
Premiss Representation In prolog, premiss types can be mapped to character¬
istic representations using the predicate characteristic/2, whose first argument
is a premiss and whose second is a characteristic representation, represented as
a Max-Min pair (see Figure 3.3). Feature structures are represented as lists of
features, and models as lists of feature structures. Note that each maximal model



























Figure 3.3: Prolog code for individual identification
28
of the corresponding characteristic diagram.
Case Identification The predicate syll/4 is the top level of the syllogism
solution procedure. It retrieves two characteristic representations, one for each
premiss, selects the minimal model (Min) from one and the maximal model (Max)
from the other, selects a critical individual from Min, and subjects it to the unifi¬
cation test. If the unification test succeeds, it returns Cone, which is instantiated
as a necessary individual. Standard prolog backtracking ensures that all critical
individuals for both premisses are tested in turn, so the predicate finds all neces¬
sary individuals for the premiss pair. Whenever the predicate succeeds, Source is
incidentally instantiated as the premiss number of the source. If there is no valid
conclusion the predicate fails immediately.
unif ication_test/3 tests the critical individual I by attempting to unify it
with all members of Max. If the bagof goal returns a singleton list, only one
unification is possible, so that unification denotes a necessary individual.
unif ication_test/3 requires a unification predicate unify/3, whose first and
second arguments are the feature structures to be unified, which succeeds with
the third argument instantiated as their unification, if this is possible, and fails
otherwise. Note that in the event of a successful unification, the features from
the first argument appear before any from the second in the result, so that in its
use above, terms from the source premiss occur before terms from the conditional
premiss.
Examples Figure 3.4 shows two examples of the prolog Individual Identifica¬
tion program in action. The first example shows the result of giving it the usual
problem, "Some of the As are Bs, All of the Bs are Cs". The program correctly
concludes ABC, and identifies the source as premiss 1. Note that the terms from
the source premiss appear first, in order. When backtracking is forced, the pro¬
gram finds no other solutions to the problem.
In the second example, the program is given a problem with two valid individ¬
uals. This time, after finding one of the solutions, when backtracking is forced,
the program finds the other solution.
To make the operation of the program clearer, it may be useful to supply a















Figure 3.4: Examples of use of the prolog code
in Figure 3.4, but with premiss order reversed; consequently the program finds the
conclusion only after some backtracking.
?- trace,syll(all(b,a),some(c,b),Cone,Source).
(1) 0 CALL: syll(all(b,a),some(c,b),_426,_460)?
(2) 1 CALL: characteristic(all(b,a),_698-_702)?
(2) 1 EXIT: characteristic(all(b,a),[[-b,-a],[-b,+a],[+b,+a]]-[[+b,+a]])
(3) 1 CALL: characteristic(some(c,b),_906-_910)?
(3) 1 EXIT: characteristic(some(c,b),[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]]-
[C+c,+b]])
Since the first two arguments of syll/4 are instantiated as the two premisses,
all(b,a) and some(c,b), the first two subgoals of syll/4 simply retrieve the
unique characteristic representations for each of the premisses.
(4) 1 CALL: nth(_460,[[[+b,+a]],[[+c,+b]]],_1162)?skip
> (4) 1 EXIT: nth(1,[ [[+b,+a]],[[+c,+b]]],[[+b,+a]] )?
Flaving translated the premisses into characteristic representations, and since
the variable Source is uninstantiated, one premiss must be selected as the putative
source premiss. The standard predicate nth/3 is used to select one minimal model
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from a list of two, one for each premiss in order, and to instantiate Source as the
source premiss number. Since the minimal models are in premiss order in the
input list, and the minimal model of the first premiss ([ [+b, +a] ]) is selected,
Source is instantiated as 1.
(5) 1 CALL: nth(l,[[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],[[-b,-a]
,[-b,+a],[+b,+a]]],_1322)?skip
> (5) 1 EXIT: nth(l,[[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],[[-b,-a]
,[-b,+a],[+b,+a]]],[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]])?
In order to pair the minimal model of one premiss with the maximal model
of the other, the input to the second nth/3 subgoal is a list of the two premiss'
maximal models in reverse premiss order. Since Source is instantiated, the first
maximal model in the list is selected, corresponding to the second premiss. Thus
the maximal model is [[-c,-b] , [+c,-b] , [+c,+b] , [-c,+b]].
(6) 1 CALL: member(_1458, [[+b,+a]])?skip
> (6) 1 EXIT: member([+b,+a],[[+b,+a]])?
Since a minimal model may have more than one member (i.e. in the case of
'None'), one of them is chosen as the critical individual. In this example, there is
only one, [+b, +a] .
(7) 1 CALL: unification_test([+b,+a],[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],_426)?s
> (7) 1 FAIL: unification_test([+b,+a],[[-c,-b],[+c,-b] ,[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],_426)?
Because there is more than one unification of the critical individual with mem¬
bers of the maximal model, unif ication_test/2 fails, forcing backtracking.
(6) 1 REDO: member([+b,+a],[[+b,+a]])?skip
> (6) 1 FAIL: member(_1458,[[+b,+a]])?
(5) 1 REDO: nth(l,[[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],[[-b,-a]
,[-b,+a],[+b,+a]]],[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]])?skip
> (5) 1 FAIL: nth(l,[[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],[[-b,-a]
,C-b,+a],[+b,+a]]],_1322)?
(4) 1 REDO: nth(l,[[[+b,+a]],[[+c,+b]]],[[+b,+a]])?skip
> (4) 1 EXIT: nth(2,[[[+b,+a]],[[+c,+b]]],[[+c,+b]])?
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Both the member/2 and second nth/3 goals admit no more solutions, so the
system backtracks to the first nth/3 goal, the selection of source premiss and
minimal model. This resatisfies, and instantiates Source as 2 and Min as the
minimal model of the second premiss, [[+c,+b]].
(8) 1 CALL: nth(2,[[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],[[-b,-a]
,[-b,+a],[+b,+a]]],_1334)?skip
> (8) 1 EXIT: nth(2,[[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],[[-b,-a]
,[-b,+a],[+b,+a]]],[[-b,-a],[-b,+a],[+b,+a]])?
Since the putative source is now 2, the second nth/3 goal succeeds and instan¬
tiates Max as the second member of the list, the maximal model of the first premiss,
[ [—b, —a] , [-b,+a] , [+b,+a]]. This time, the unification test will succeed, since
there is only one member of the maximal model ([+b,+a]) with which the only
critical individual ([+c,+b]) can unify.
(9) 1 CALL: member(_1482, [[+c,+b]])?skip
> (9) 1 EXIT: member( [+c,+b], [[+c,+b]])?
(10) 1 CALL: unification_test([+c,+b],[[-b,-a],[-b,+a],[+b,+a]],_426)?skip
>(10) 1 EXIT: unification_test([+c,+b],[[-b,-a],[-b,+a],[+b,+a]],[+c,+b,+a])?




unif ication_test/2 is satisfied, and so the top-level goal succeeds; the conclu¬
sion is [+c,+b,+a] and the source is premiss 2. Backtracking is forced, to search
for further valid conclusions, but no subgoals can resatisfy, and so the top-level
goal fails.
(1) 0 REDO: syll(all(b,a),some(c,b),[+c,+b,+a],2)?
(10) 1 REDO: unification_test([+c,+b],[[-b,-a],[-b,+a],[+b,+a]],[+c,+b,+a])?s
>(10) 1 FAIL: unification_test([+c,+b],[[-b,-a],[-b,+a],[+b,+a]],_426)?
(9) 1 REDO: member([+c,+b],[[+c,+b]])?skip
> (9) 1 FAIL: member(_1482,[[+c,+b]])?
(8) 1 REDO: nth(2,[[[-c,-b],[+c,-b],[+c,+b],[-c,+b]],[[-b,-a],
[-b,+a],[+b,+a]]],[[-b,-a],[-b,+a],[+b,+a]] )?skip















Figure 3.5: Prolog code for multiple premisses.
(4) 1 REDO
















The case of multiple premisses
Program code The prolog code can be adapted to the case of multiple syllogis¬
tic premisses, as shown in Figure 3.5. As before, the task is to identify maximally
specified necessary individuals, so that each term occurring in the premisses must
have a determinate value in the conclusion.
The two predicatesmultsyll/3 and msyll/3 replace the old top-level predicate
syll/4. multsyll/3 is the new top-level predicate, and its first argument is a list
of premisses. It selects a premiss from the list to function as source, retrieves a
member of the minimal model for this premiss (Ind), and passes this, along with
the list of the remaining premisses (Rest) to msyll/3. In the event that msyll/3
fails, backtracking ensures that each premiss is selected in turn as putative source.
msyll/3 is a recursive predicate to handle the rest of the premisses. Its first
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Figure 3.6: Multiple premiss examples.
argument is the critical individual entailed by the premisses processed so far, and
its second argument is a list of premisses yet to be processed. The first clause
defines the base case: if the list of premisses is empty, it returns the value of
the first argument as the conclusion. In the recursive case, msyll/3 selects one
of the premisses, retrieves its maximal model, and performs the unification test
on the input critical individual Ind. Provided this is successful, the resulting
necessary individual (Cone) is passed recursively to msyll/3 along with the rest
of the premisses.
Examples and discussion The operation of msyll/3 can be summarised as
the repeated application of conditionals to an input individual derived from the
source, which in turn is identified by multsyll/3. Thus the multiple-premiss case
also crucially depends on the source/conditional distinction. The program can
handle premisses in any order: the logic of the problem determines the output
term order.
Figure 3.6 shows two example problems. In the first example, the order of terms
34
in the conclusion is fully determined since the order of application of conditional
premisses is determined. As in the two-premiss case, the terms from the source
premiss appear first. The second example shows a problem where term order is
not fully determined, since there is a choice in the order in which conditionals
may be applied. Nevertheless, all conditional applications presuppose the source
premiss, so its terms always appear first.
As far as I know, the program is complete for its domain, but since the prop¬
erties of the domain have not been fully explored, this is at present unproven. It
constitutes an extension of the two-premiss program, since it generates exactly
the same results as syll/4 when given a list of two premisses.
3.3.3 Implementation in Monadic Predicate Calculus
This section demonstrates how the Individual Identification Algorithm can be
implemented in Monadic Predicate Calculus (MPC).
Representation in MPC In MPC, each premiss can be represented as the
conjunction of two sentences, which function analogously to the minimal and
maximal models. The first is a conjunction of sentences, each of which estab¬
lishes the existence of a member of the minimal model. Thus this component
carries the existential implications of the premiss under its standard syllogistic in¬
terpretation. The second sentence is a universally quantified representation of the
truth conditions of the premiss in canonical disjunctive normal form (see Lemmon
1965), which has the property that every elementary conjunction in it specifies a
unique interpretation of the premiss. It is therefore very like a truth-table. These
characteristic sentences are given in Figure 3.7.
Case Identification in MPC Figure 3.8 shows an example proof in Monadic
Predicate Calculus for the example Some of the As are Bs, All of the Bs are Cs.
Lines (1) and (2) are the assumptions, which are representations in our chosen
form for the two premisses. In line (3) the sentence corresponding to the minimal
model for premiss 1 is derived; since this is existentially quantified, (4) assumes
the corresponding arbitrarily instantiated sentence. Lines (5) and (6) derive the
maximal model for premiss 2, and instantiate it with the chosen arbitrary name.
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All A B (3x){AxkBx)k
{Vy)((Ay&By) V (~<Ay&,By) V (-^Ay&^By))
Some A B (3x)(Ax&Bx)&,
i^y){{AyhBy) V {pAy&cBy) V (Ay&c-iBy) V (-^Ay&L^By))
No A B ((3a:)(-iAx&5x)&(3y)(A?/&;-iBy))&
z)((~,Az$zBz) V (Az8z-iBz) V (-iAz&c-iBz))
Some A not B (3x)(Ax&->Bx)8z
iVy)i(AyfoBy) V (-1Ay&tBy) V (Ay&~iBy) V {-^Ayk,~^By))
Figure 3.7: Characteristic sentences for the MPC implementation
Most of the remainder of the proof is an V-elimination, so each of the disjuncts in
(6) must be assumed in turn, as in lines (7), (11) and (15). The strategy is to find
one of these disjuncts which has the same formula containing the B predicate as in
(4) (which denotes a member of the minimal model for the first premiss), then to
unify it with the formula in (4), to give a formula denoting the necessary individual
(9). When the disjunct contains a contradictory formula for the B term, then we
derive a contradiction (as in (13) and (17)), and using Reductio Ad Absurdum we
are then permitted to derive anything (P8z->P F Q), so we derive the same formula
as we did by unification, as in (14) and (18). Since each of the disjuncts in (5)
entails the same conclusion, V-elimination is permitted, discharging the auxiliary
assumptions (7), (11) and (15) so that the conclusion now follows from (2) and
(4). Since the name in (4) does not occur in (2), 3-elimination is permitted, so
the existentially quantified conclusion now follows from (1) and (2).
When more than one of the disjuncts is unifiable with the member of the
minimal model, we can only derive a disjunctive conclusion by V-elimination.
The natural deduction system is a variant on Lemmon's "Beginning Logic",
with &-elimination and V-elimination generalised to handle multiple conjuncts
and disjuncts respectively, for convenience and to shorten the proofs.
3.3.4 Predicate Calculus again, but simpler!
The MPC model above is quite complex, since it is a literal translation of the
graphical method. It is worthwhile to show that the source/conditional distinc¬
tion also applies to a more conventional implementation of the IIA in Monadic
Predicate Calculus. Figure 3.9 shows the premiss representations.
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1 (1) (3x)(Ax$zBx)$z(Vy)((Ay$zBy)\/
(-*Ay8zBy) V (AySz-^By) V (-^AySz-^By)) A
2 (2) (3x)(BxkCx)Sz
(Vy)i(BykCy) V (-.BykCy) V (-.Byk^Cy)) A
1 (3) (3x)(AxkBx) 1 &E
4 (4) (AakBa) A
2 (5) (\/y)((BykCy) V (-BykCy) V (^Byk^Cy)) 2 &E
2 (6) (BakCa) V (-iBakCa) V (-^Bak-^Ca) 5 VE
7 (7) (BakCa) A
7 (8) Ca 7 kE
4,7 (9) (AakBakCa) 4,8 &I
4 (10) Ba 4 &E
11 (11) (-iBakCa) A
11 (12) -*Ba 11 &E
4,11 (13) (Bak^Ba) 10,12 kl
4,11 (14) (Aak.Bak.Ca) 13 RAA
15 (15) (~^Bak~*Ca) A
15 (16) -iBa 15 &E
4,15 (17) (Bak-*Ba) 9,16 &I
4,15 (18) (AakBakCa) 17 RAA
4,2 (19) {AakBakCa) 6,7,9,11,14,15,18 VE
1,2 (20) (3x) {AxkBxkCx) 3,4,19 3E
Figure 3.8: An example proof in MPC.
All A B (yx){Ax-+Bx)
Some A B (3x)(Ax$zBx)
No A B (\/x)(Ax —>■ ~^Bx)
Some A not B (3x)(Ax&,~^Bx)
Figure 3.9: Direct translation of premisses into Predicate Calculus.
37
Consider any valid syllogism. A proof of either an individual or quantified
conclusion must crucially use at least one of the premiss representations for a con¬
ditional inference (either modus ponens or modus tollens). This is the conditional
premiss, and it must be an "All" or "No" premiss. The other provides the input to
this main conditional, in the form of an atomic sentence representing the middle
term. This premiss may be either particular or universal. If it is particular, the
proof strategy is 3-elimination, followed by .^-elimination, followed by the main
conditional inference, whereas if it is universal, after V-elimination, it is neces¬
sary to assume an atomic sentence and apply a conditional inference to derive the
middle-term sentence for input into the main conditional.
One of the premisses, the source, serves to assert the existence of something,
either directly or indirectly, whereas the other, the conditional, serves as a license
to infer something else from that initial assertion. Processing the source premiss
is a logical prerequisite for the application of the conditional. It should be obvious
that the distinction is likely to apply to quite a wide range of methods—this may
help to motivate the use made below of the distinction in analysing term order
effects in human reasoning data.
3.3.5 Discussion of the Implementations
While the parallel with the Euler Circles method informed the development of the
prolog program and the first MPC method, these differ from the Euler Circles
implementation in one major respect. The complete maximal model is never con¬
structed at any point during the processing cycle; instead, the source/conditional
distinction is assumed from the outset. This results in a kind of focussing on
critical individuals, and so only the parts of the maximal model which directly
intersect with critical individuals are constructed. By contrast, the graphical na¬
ture of the Euler Circles method imposes specificity even where the status of the
individuals represented could never be of consequence (Stenning & Oberlander
1994, 1995).
The corollary of this is that in the prolog and MPC models, for particular
premisses, the part of the characteristic representation representing the maximal
model is redundant. Since these premiss types only ever function as source, the
maximal model component could in principle be omitted entirely. It is easy to im-
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plement this "optimisation", by simply replacing the maximal model components
with empty lists, as below.
characteristic(some(A,B),[]-[C+A,+B]]).
characteristic(somenot(A,B),[]-[[+A,-B]] ).
While it would presumably be possible to strip down the Euler Circles repre¬
sentations in some way to achieve the same effect, the graphical method would lose
its immediacy, and in any case the method as it stands is arguably more efficient,
since it tests all critical regions in a single diagram.
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Chapter 4
Figural Effects and Mental
Models Theory
Figural effects in human syllogistic reasoning are response biases in the order of
end terms in conclusions, which are correlated with the Figure of the premisses
(Johnson-Laird & Steedman 1978). The effect can be summarised roughly as the
tendency for end terms in conclusions to retain their grammatical status from the
premiss in which they occur. Thus when the Figure is ab/bc, ac conclusions are
commonest, ba/cb problems give rise to ca conclusions, and there is less overall bias
when the Figure is ab/cb or ba/bc. These are highly reliable effects, which have
been shown to occur in both valid conclusions (where the conclusion is convertible)
and invalid conclusions.
This Chapter first describes and critically analyses Johnson-Laird et aVs Men¬
tal Models account of the Figural Effect, and presents the results of an unpublished
experiment which bears on some of the issues raised by the critical analysis. A
novel alternative account of the Figural Effect, based on the Individual Identifi¬
cation Algorithm and the source/conditional distinction, is then introduced and
elaborated (first published in an early version by Yule & Stenning 1992). This
account forms the basis for the statistical analyses of the Figural Effect presented
in subsequent Chapters.
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a b be a b c
a b + b c —>■ a b c
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.1: Constructing an integrated Mental Model for the problem Some of the
As are Bs, All of the Bs are Cs. Because the b tokens are contiguous, the models
can be joined by superimposing the b columns.
4.1 The Mental Models account of the Figural
Effect
Johnson-Laird's explanation for the Figural Effect (Johnson-Laird 1983, Johnson-
Laird & Bara 1984, Byrne & Johnson-Laird 1991) depends on a presumed First
In-First Out (FIFO) characteristic of working memory, in which Mental Models
are held to be created and integrated. The order in which mental models are
entered into working memory is constrained by the need to link the models via
the tokens corresponding to the middle term. Consequently, in ab/bc problems,
the mental model for Premiss 1 enters working memory, followed by the mental
model for Premiss 2, allowing the b tokens to be brought into contiguity, and
the FIFO rule ensures that the a term is read off before the c term, giving an
a-c conclusion (see Fig. 4.1). In ba/cb problems, the need to bring the b tokens
into contiguity entails that the mental model for Premiss 2 must be entered into
working memory first, followed by that for Premiss 1, so the FIFO rule produces
a c-a conclusion.
It is necessary to extend the range of processes available in order to handle
problems with the ab/cb and ba/bc Figures, which on the account so far cannot be
solved, because the b tokens cannot be made contiguous. Johnson-Laird proposes
that mental models can be "switched round", i.e. the term order is inverted.
If one of the mental models is switched round, the other mental model can be
integrated with it. The term order of the conclusion thus depends on which of the
mental models is switched round, and since either route is available, both possible
term orderings can occur. However, Johnson-Laird makes some predictions of
the relative likelihood of each term ordering in each Figure on the basis of the
complexity of operations required to form an integrated model. He assumes the
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Operations ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
Switch round — Pr. 2 — Pr. 1 — — Pr. 1 Pr. 2
Build model Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 2 Pr. 1 Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 1 Pr. 2
Renew — Pr. 1 Pr. 1 — — Pr. 1 — Pr. 1
Switch round — Pr. 1 — Pr. 2 Pr. 2 Pr. 1 — —
Integrate Pr. 2 Pr. 1 Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 2 Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 1
Predicted
Response bias: a-c c-a c-a a-c a-c c-a a-c c-a
Obtained
Response bias:
Experiment 1 89% 11% 91% 9% 50% 50% 64% 36%
Experiment 2 93% 7% 86% 14% 55% 45% 62% 38%
Experiment 3 94% 6% 66% 34% 56% 44% 73% 27%
Table 4.1: A modification of Johnson-Laird's (1983) Table 5.3 (pl09) in which the
operation 'switch round' is permitted in the ab/bc and ba/cb Figures, permitting
counterfigural responses in these Figures (italicised columns).
simplest way is the one which is preferentially followed.
Unfortunately the addition of the switching operation to the theory must be
restricted to the ab/cb and ba/bc Figures (the symmetric Figures) only, since the
possibility of switching both mental models for the ab/bc or ba/cb Figures (i.e.
the diagonal Figures) would permit counterfigural responses in these Figures, and
the theory would then permit any term ordering in any Figure. Johnson-Laird
(1983) does not discuss the reason for this restriction explicitly, but it is worth
noting that it makes the explanation of the Figural Effects different in different
Figures, weakening the explanatory power of the theory. A more adequate theory
of Figural Effects would explain ordering effects in a uniform fashion across the
Figures, instead of relativising explanation to specific groups of Figures.
The most obvious variant of Johnson-Laird's (1983) explanation which meets
this criterion would permit switching round, and consequently counterfigural re¬
sponses, in the diagonal Figures, but argue that subjects will typically use the most
efficient available method for forming integrated mental models, so the methods
which result in counterfigural responses in these Figures will rarely be used. A
variant of Johnson-Laird's (1983) Table 5.3 (pl09) based on this proposal is shown
here in Table 4.1.
According to Johnson-Laird (1983), the complexity of operations required
should affect the ease with which valid conclusions can be drawn, so the four
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Figures should show a trend of increasing difficulty, since ab/bc requires a min¬
imum of two operations, ba/cb additionally requires renewal1 of a premiss, and
ab/cb and ba/bc require a 'switching round' operation. Assuming that renewal
~ switching in difficulty, then error frequency in the four Figures should be dis¬
tributed thus: e(ab/bc) < e{ba/cb) ~ e{ab/cb) ~ e(ba/bc). Johnson-Laird & Bara
(1984) provide evidence that e(ab/bc) < e(ba/cb) < e(ab/cb) < e{ba/bc), which
could be accommodated by assuming that switching round has more effect on
the error rate than does renewal, a plausible assumption given the possibility of
conversion errors due to switching and the likely reliability of renewal in circum¬
stances where both premisses are available for inspection throughout. Also, as
Table 4.1 shows, counterfigural responses do occur in reasonable numbers in the
diagonal Figures, relatively infrequently in ab/bc, where the counterfigural route
is the most complex of all, and slightly more frequently in ba/cb, where the coun¬
terfigural route is presumably the next most complex route before the c-a routes in
the symmetric Figures. So overall, the revised model shows reasonable consonance
with the data.
The rarity of counterfigural responses in the diagonal Figures is thus explained
by the hypothesis that the simplest available way of forming an integrated model
is preferentially followed, so the Figural Effect is due to the optimization of the
model-construction process. While the operation of switching is available for diag¬
onal Figure problems, it is unnecessarily complicated to use it, so it rarely happens.
However, there is a possibility of observing the effects of changing the relative dif¬
ficulty of switching and renewal by experimental manipulation, so for example
decreasing the attractiveness of the renewal option might increase the likelihood
of a switching strategy in ba/cb, resulting in more counterfigural responses. The
Levy (1984) experiment explores one means by which such circumstances might
be created.
4.2 The Levy (1984) Experiment
In the syllogistic reasoning task normally employed by Mental Models researchers,
subjects draw conclusions from pairs of premisses which are presented together. In
' Accessing the premiss a second time, i.e. rereading it or recovering it from memory.
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ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc Overall
Single-premiss 50 52 48 58 53
Double-premiss 60 60 57 60 59
Mean 55 56 53 59 56
Table 4.2: % correct valid conclusions in each Figure and Presentation condition.
Reproduced from Levy (1984)
the present case, however, the standard double-premiss presentation (D) is com¬
pared with single-premiss presentation (S), in which premisses are presented singly,
with removal of the first from the subject's field of view on presentation of the
second. Since single-premiss mode makes renewal more difficult (the first premiss
must be kept in memory, which is more fallible than paper or a VDU), we expect
more errors in single-premiss mode than double-premiss mode. If subjects' selec¬
tion of model-construction strategies is sensitive to this disadvantage, then there
should be an increased tendency for them to choose non-renewing model construc¬
tion strategies in single-premiss mode, resulting in an increase in the number of a-c
responses in ba/cb, ab/cb and ba/bc, compared with double-premiss mode. Dou¬
ble premiss mode should replicate Johnson-Laird's results, since it is the control
condition.
Since Working Memory span measures are available for each subject, it is also
possible to test for correlations between memory span and performance. Mental
Models theory is committed to the importance of memory capacity in determining
performance, and thus presumably predicts positive correlations between memory
span and performance in all Figures.
Table 4.2 shows the percentage correct valid conclusions in each Figure and pre¬
sentation condition. Overall, the single-premiss condition produced fewer correct
valid conclusions than did the double-premiss condition as predicted, (Wilcoxon's
T{25) = 83, p < 0.025, one — tailed), but the differences were not significant
within individual Figure groups, possibly due to the small sample sizes. There
was no significant effect of Figure on percentage correct valid conclusions (Jonck-
lieere Trend Tests on S and S+D pooled).
Table 4.3 shows the percentages of a-c and c-a responses in each Figure and
Presentation condition. Double-premiss mode is a straightforward replication of
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ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc



















a-c Bias 98.6 97.3 6.0 1.7 38.4 46.6 51.3 61.4
Table 4.3: % of a-c and c-a responses in each Figure and Presentation condition.
Reproduced from Levy (1984)
ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
WM Measure 2+2 3+3 2+2 3+3 2+2 3+3 2+2 3+3
Single premiss -0.12 0.18 0.62 0.61 0l24 (120 0.21 -0.02
Double premiss -0.02 -0.08 0.38 0.16 -0.13 -0.13 -0.04 -0.25
Table 4.4: Pearson's Correlations between % correct valid conclusions, for single-
premiss and double-premiss presentation modes, and the 2+2 and 3+3 working
memory measures, in each Figure. Boldface indicates significance at the 5% level,
one-tailed. N=10 in each Figure.
the standard paradigm, so we predict strong a-c and c-a biases for ab/bc and
ba/cb respectively, and smaller a-c biases for the symmetric Figures. Although
the other three Figures are in line with prediction, ab/cb shows a slight c-a bias.
We expect single-premiss mode to increase the likelihood of a-c responses in all
Figures. Insignificant increases are observed in the diagonal Figures, but decreases
in the numbers of a-c responses are observed in the symmetric Figures, contrary
to prediction.
Table 4.4 shows correlations between percentage correct valid conclusions and
memory span, for both presentation modes and memory span measures, in each
of the four Figures. We expect positive correlations, but find them only for ba/cb
subjects, with single-premiss presentation, where % correct valid conclusions cor¬
relates significantly with both 2+2 and 3+3 working memory test scores.
Discussion of Levy (1984) While single-premiss presentation made reasoning
more error-prone overall, there was no sign of a change in model-construction
strategy to avoid renewal-based strategies, evidenced by the lack of increase in the
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ac bias for ba/cb, ab/cb and ba/bc in single-premiss mode. Possibly switching is
unavailable in ba/cb, as Johnson-Laird (1983) assumes, but the failure of subjects
to take advantage of switching in the symmetric Figures is surprising, given that
Johnson-Laird (1983) assumes that they must in any case use it at least once to
succeed in those problems.
The correlation results show no overall effect of Working Memory span, as
measured by the 2+2 and 3+3 tests, on performance. Perhaps the tests do not
measure the right kind of memory, but the presence of strong correlations, as
predicted but in ba/cb only, suggests that single-premiss mode does impose a
memory load in this Figure. While the unamended account of the Figural Effect
can accommodate this finding on the grounds that ba/cb is the only Figure which
requires the "renew" operation, whereas in all the other Figures it is possible to
build the model on the basis of the first premiss, this would entail an increase in
the number of ac conclusions in single premiss mode in the symmetric Figures,
which does not occur.
The absence of the predicted trend of increasing difficulty with Figure in this
experiment may be due to the between-subjects design, but it is worth mentioning
that the analysis used by Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) to test this hypothesis
is rather gross, insofar as no attempt was made to control for problem difficulty
among the Figures. It is harder to dismiss Johnson-Laird & Bara's latency results,
which also showed an increasing trend with Figure, since in this case only single-
model problems were used in the analysis.
Johnson-Laird is left with the dilemma that either the exclusion of switching
in the diagonal Figures in his theory is arbitrary but has a degree of confirmation
in practice, or the version of the theory without such restriction is not arbitrary,
but not reliably confirmed either. Moreover, there is very little direct evidence for
the involvement of FIFO memory in syllogistic reasoning. A study by Gilhooly et
al (1993), which did directly address the issue, failed to show expected suppression
effects, though this may have been due to methodological problems of incomplete
suppression.
In any event, such appeal to details of memory implementation seems prema¬
ture when we there is so wide a range of types of implementation which are not
distinguishable on the basis of input/output mappings. Natural implementations
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of the IIA in both graphical and sentential modes generate ordered term structures
without making any highly specific assumptions about the substrate of term-order
memory. It is clear from the published data (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Steedman 1978,
Johnson-Laird & Bara 1984) that the grammatical organisation of conclusions in¬
teracts powerfully with the quantifiers as well as with Figure. What is needed is
an explanation of the how the grammatical structuring effects result from the pro¬
cesses of reasoning rather than a characterisation of the substrate which preserves
order information, especially when it is clear that several substrates may equally
well achieve the same effect.
Before moving on to present a novel account of the Figural Effect, a recent
proposal by Wetherick (1989, Wetherick & Gilhooly 1990) must also be considered.
This relates the Figural Effect to discourse understanding phenomena. In short,
subjects seek to find the topic of the syllogistic mini-discourse, and tend to pick
a subject end term for this purpose. In the ab/bc and ba/cb, this leads to ac or
ca conclusions only, respectively, while in ab/cb there is a choice of subject end
terms, so an approximately 50/50 split is expected. Only ba/bc lacks a subject
end term, but again there is nothing to choose between the premisses, so again we
expect a 50/50 split. Expressed this way, we expect only the gross Figural Effect,
so this theory predicts exactly the same as does Mental Models.
If a theory can predict specific term orderings individually for syllogisms, the
logical structure of the Figures can result in an emergent gross Figural Effect
of the type that has been considered up to now. This point can be clarified
by consideration of the fact that the problems in ba/cb are identical to those in
ab/bc, except for the premiss reversal of course, while inside each of the symmetric
Figures, half the problems are equivalent to the other half, except for premiss
reversal. Thus any theory that makes problem-by-problem predictions of term
order will automatically produce an overall 50/50 split in the symmetric Figures.
In the diagonal Figures, a within-Figure imbalance in the number of problems
predicted to have each of the term orders will result in the characteristic overall
inversion of preferred orderings between these Figures. Any such theory would
have far greater explanatory power than theories, such as those discussed above,
which simply predict the gross Figural Effect without making any within-Figure
discriminations.
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To address this challenge, Section 4.3 elaborates an alternative account of the
Figural Effect, in terms of the source/conditional distinction. This generates pre¬
dictions which are tested in Chapter 5 using data from the novel Individuals Task.
The results of this experiment are used to guide the construction of statistical
models of term ordering in Chapter 6.
4.3 Individuals and Figural Effects
The IIA casts the syllogistic reasoning task as one of constructing three-term
descriptions of critical individuals. In the graphical version of the algorithm, these
descriptions correspond to x-marked regions in a finished diagram. In the simple
predicate calculus version of the algorithm, they are the three-conjunct statements
completed by application of MP or MT followed by conjoining of the concluded
clause.
As has been demonstrated, the source premiss is identified as the premiss con¬
tributing the x which persists into the final diagram. In the simple predicate calcu¬
lus implementation, the source premiss is the one which must be processed first, in
preparation for the main conditional inference licensed by the conditional premiss.
One logical generalisation about source premisses is particularly noteworthy—if
there is an existential premiss, then it is the source premiss—but since universals
have existential consequences in the conventional interpretation of the syllogism,
these can be source premisses too. In general, the source premiss for some valid
individual is any premiss which makes an existential assertion, from which the ex¬
istence of that individual can be inferred by using the other (conditional) premiss
as a rule of inference. For each valid individual for each syllogism, that individual
may specify a unique source (e.g. Figure 4.2), or fail to because more than one
derivation of that individual from those premisses is possible.
The source premiss property of problems is empirically interesting because it is
distributed unevenly among the four Figures, in a way that appears to parallel the
Figural Effect. That is, there is a tendency for ab/bc conclusions to have source
Premiss 1, ba/cb conclusions to have source Premiss 2, and for the symmetric
Figures to have equal numbers of conclusions with each source premiss. This is
a reflection of the logical Figural Effect in the Standard Task, where there is an
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Figure 4.2: Registration diagram for a problem with source Premiss 2
imbalance in the numbers of valid conclusions with each possible term order in
each Figure. In ab/bc, for example, there are more unconvertable ac valid conclu¬
sions than ca ones. The distribution of source parallels this logical Figural Effect,
so that, usually, unconvertable ac conclusions have source premiss 1, and uncon¬
vertable ca conclusions have source premiss 2. The exceptions are the problems
which have unconvertible, counterfigural2 conclusions but no unique source (see
diagram vn2 in Figure A.l in Appendix A.l).
However, there are also convertible conclusions with unique source, and in these
cases it appears that the source premiss predicts human reasoners' preferences
quite well. In the second premiss source problem in Figure 4.2, for example, the
overwhelmingly most popular conclusion is "Some of the Cs are As" (Johnson-
Laird 1983)
The confounding influence of unconvertible valid conclusions makes the Stan¬
dard Task an unsatisfactory testbed for hypotheses about source premisses. How¬
ever in the Individuals Task, in which all conclusions are convertible, we expect
source to give rise to term order phenomena comparable to the Standard Task
Figural Effect, both for problems whose Standard Task conclusions are convert¬
ible, and those which are not. In particular, we expect that the end term from the
source premiss will tend to precede the conditional premiss end term in conclu¬
sions, but given that the individual descriptions contain the middle term b as well
as the end terms, we expect the terms from the source premiss to constitute the
head of the description, possibly in their premiss order, followed by the remaining
end term. The uneven distribution of problem types should then give rise to an
end-term order pattern similar to the overall Figural Effect. Thus we might be
2As used by Johnson-Laird (1983), this refers to problems whose only valid conclusions have
term order opposite to the figurally preferred order, e.g. only valid ca conclusions in ab/bc
problems
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able to reduce the Figural Effects to the consequence of a strategy of beginning
the construction of the individual description from the source premiss.
The next Chapter introduces the Individuals Task, and presents some compar¬
isons of Standard Task and Individuals Task performance results, before proceed¬
ing to analyses of term order phenomena in order to evaluate the hypothesis that
the source/conditional distinction is the underlying cause of the Figural Effect.
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Chapter 5
The Individuals Task Experiment
5.1 Introduction
The case-identifiability property of syllogisms, and the IIA constructed on its se¬
mantic basis, suggest both an explanation of ordering effects at an appropriate
level of abstraction, and a method of gaining much richer data about mental pro¬
cesses. The IIA is a method for deciding whether there is any maximally specified
individual which must exist in any model of the premisses, and of constructing
a specification if any does exist. What distinguishes the algorithm is precisely
the division of the reasoning process into a part which builds up specifications of
fully determined individuals, and a part which draws conclusions by abstracting
away from these specifications. The task which most directly operationalises the
first half of this process is the task of giving descriptions of maximally specified
individuals whose existence is entailed by the premisses.
This task has two main virtues for studying Figural Effects in reasoning.
The sequence of terms in the description of such individuals is always logically
immaterial—existential conjunctions of terms are indifferent to reordering of con-
juncts. In the conventional task of drawing quantified conclusions, not all conclu¬
sions are validly convertible, and so sequence of terms is confounded with validity
of conclusion. Additionally, the modified task yields data on all three terms of the
syllogism, rather than just on end terms.
It should be obvious that this Individuals Task, having uniform quantifica-
tional structure in conclusions, should be better suited to evaluate claims about
the relative difficulty of single- and multiple-model problems than is the Standard
Task of drawing quantified conclusions relating the end terms. The evidence for
a difference in difficulty is confounded, in the Standard Task, by the quantifica-
tional structure of conclusions, since multiple-model problems also tend to have
conclusions in a different mood from either of the premisses, whereas single-model
problems usually do not (Ford 1994).
Finally, the Individuals Task allows us to investigate whether naive reasoners
agree with Aristotle that nothing follows from two negative premisses. If sub¬
jects can find the maximal individuals entailed by the premisses which licence
U-conclusions, that provides evidence that the IIA underlies their reasoning.
In Section 5.2 below, the Durham Standard Task dataset is used for a problem-
by-problem comparison with the Individuals Task data, to establish the relation
between the performance profiles of the two tasks. The aim is to assess the degree
of psychological, as opposed to logical similarity between the tasks. One basis for
comparison is the difference in difficulty between single- and multiple-model prob¬
lems; this can serve as a benchmark for evaluating performance on U-conclusion
problems, against performance on conventionally valid multiple-model problems.
The remaining analyses, in Section 5.3, concern term ordering phenomena in
the Individuals Task. The aim is to examine the novel data on middle term
position in individual descriptions, and to test predictions of the effects of source
premisses on term order.
5.2 Comparison with the Standard Task
In order to investigate the relation between performance on the Individuals Task
and performance on the Standard Task, two scattergrams were constructed, show¬
ing data from problems without Valid Conclusions (Figure 5.1) and with Valid
Conclusions (Figure 5.2) respectively1. Each point represents a single problem,
and its X and Y values represent the percentage of subjects who responded cor¬
rectly to it on each task. Moreover, each problem is labelled with the name of
its diagram type (see Figure A.l in Appendix A.l). Since the U-conclusion prob¬
lems have valid conclusions in the Individuals Task but not in the Standard Task,
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Figure 5.1: Scatter plot showing scores on NVC problems in both tasks.
results for these problems on the two tasks are not directly comparable, so they
have been omitted from the main analysis. However, they have been plotted on
Figure 5.2 using a different marker type for convenience.
Figure 5.1 shows problem-by-problem accuracy for problems without valid con¬
clusions (see Tables B.11-B.21 in Appendix B.3 for complete tabulation of the raw
data for NVC problems). Although scores on the Individuals Task are higher
than those on the Standard Task, problem difficulty is highly correlated between
the two tasks (r = 0.88, 26 d.f. p < 0.0005). By inspection, the problems fall
into two groups, one high-scoring and one low-scoring; moreover, no diagram type
represented in either of the groups occurs in the other group. The high-scoring
group is comprised of problems from diagram types np3, nn3, nn4, nn5, nn6, nn7
and nn8, while the low-scoring group comprises diagram types npl, np2, nnl and
nn2. This pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects use
the Aristotelian generalisations,
• No problem with two particular premisses has a valid conclusion
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Figure 5.2: Scatter plot showing scores on VC problems in both tasks. Also shown
are the U-conclusion problems, marked with circles in the box at top left - since
these have valid conclusions in only the Individuals Task, their Standard Task
scores are not comparable with the rest of the Standard Task scores on this chart.
The set of problems which can be decided by these rules is exactly the high-
scoring group just identified; the rest, which cannot be decided by these rules,
correspond to the set identified as the low-scoring problems. From Figure 5.2 it
can be verified that the Standard Task scores for U-conclusion problems, where
the correct response is No Valid Conclusion, fall in the same high-scoring region
as would be expected on this hypothesis.
Note, however, that this 'Aristotelian' partitioning of problems can be equiva-
lently described by reference to the presence or absence of an 'All' premiss: prob¬
lems with two particular or two negative premisses are ipso facto those without
an 'All' premiss, so the high-scoring problems are those without an 'All' premiss,
whereas the low-scoring problems are those with an 'All' premiss. This is relevant
to the discussion of the A-Effect in Section 7.2 below.
Figure 5.2 is a plot of performance on both tasks for problems with valid conclu¬
sions (see Tables B.1-B.8 in Appendix B.l for complete tabulation of the raw data
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for problems with valid conclusions). For convenience, the U-conclusion problems
are represented with circles appearing in the top left region (see Tables B.9 and
B.10 in Appendix B.2). The valid conclusion results are less highly correlated than
the NVC results (r = 0.56, 24 d.f. p < 0.005); this is due to a substantial subset
of problems in the bottom right region with high Individuals Task scores but very
low Standard Task scores. As in Figure 5.1 there is a group of problems with high
scores on both tasks: these are instances of diagram types vpl, vp3, vnl and vn4,
and as before no other instances of these diagram types appear anywhere else on
the chart. All but one of the single-model diagram types occur in this group. In
bottom left region the two multiple-models vn5 problems have low scores on both
tasks. Finally, in the uncorrelated region at the bottom right, there are the vn3,
vn2 and vp2 problems, with medium to high scores on the Individuals Task, but
low scores on the Standard Task.
Since vp2 is a single-model problem, Mental Models theory would predict it to
have a high level of Standard Task performance similar to the other single-model
problems, rather than being as difficult as the multiple-models problems vn2 and
vn3 as observed. Ford (1994) notes that vp2 is reliably difficult in other Standard
Task experiments, and observes that it is the only single-model problem whose
valid conclusion is in a different mood from either of the premisses, a property
it shares with vn2 and vn3 problems. Choosing a suitable quantifier for the con¬
clusion is a source of difficulty which occurs in the Standard task but not in the
Individuals task, so it is reasonable to suppose that this different-mood hypoth¬
esis accounts for the observed difference in difficulty between the tasks for these
problems. However, since most of the Standard Task multiple-models problems
are vn2 and vn3 problems, the different-mood hypothesis undermines most of the
evidence for a difference in difficulty between single-model and multiple-models
problems.
In terms of the Individuals task alone, there is overlap between single-model
and multiple-model performance; some vn3 and vn2 problems show similar high
levels of performance to single-model problems. However the variation in multiple-
model problem scores is much greater than in single-model scores. From the graph
it is clear that while generating valid U-conclusions is fairly difficult, there are
other multiple-model problems with comparable levels of difficulty. One of the
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Error conclusion Error NVC







Table 5.1: Mean Percentages of error conclusions and error NVC responses in
both the Individuals Task (N=22) and Standard Task (N=24), for single-model,
multiple-models and U-multiple-models problems (Individuals Task only).
vn5 problems shows lower scores than any U-conclusion problem, and the spread
of U-conclusion problems overlaps to a considerable extent the distribution of vn2
and vn3 problems. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to consider the U-conclusion
problems as multiple-models problems.
We can use a mixed-model Analysis of Variance to investigate the effect of
number of models (repeated measures) on percentage error rates, for both Indi¬
viduals Task and Standard Task subjects. Two ANOVAs were conducted, using
percentage of error conclusion responses and error NVC responses respectively as
the dependent variables. Table 5.1 shows for both Tasks, how mean percentages of
error conclusions and error NVC responses vary between single-model, multiple-
models and U-multiple-models problems.
Percentages of error conclusions are higher in multiple-models problems than
in single-model problems, for both tasks (Overall : F( 1, 44) = 34.84, p < 0.0001).
There is also a main effect of Task, such that there are more error conclusions in the
Standard Task than in the Individuals Task (F(l,44) = 11.07, p < 0.0018), and
there is a significant interaction between number of models and task (F(l,44) =
8.40, p < 0.0058). Although the difference between single-model and multiple-
models problems is smaller in the Individuals Task, it is nonetheless significant
(t(21) = 2.67, p < 0.01); however there is no significant difference in percentages
of Error Individuals between multiple-models and U-multiple-models problems
(£(21) = 0.35, n.s.).
Similarly for Error NVC responses, there are main effects of number of models
(F(l, 44) = 95.22, p < 0.0001), task (F(l,44) = 27.23, p < 0.0001) and a task
by number of models interaction (F(l,44) = 28.08, p < 0.0001). Again, despite
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the interaction, there are significantly more error NVC responses to multiple-
models problems than to single-model ones in the Individuals Task (£(21) =
4.14, p < 0.0005), but also there are significantly more error NVC responses
to U-multiple-models problems than to conventional multiple-models problems
(£(21) = 2.30, p < 0.025).
So the Individuals Task shows an effect of the number of models which is
similar to, but less extreme than, the effect familiar from the literature on the
Standard Task: multiple-models problems cause more errors of both types than
do single-model problems. The U-multiple-models problems, which only occur in
the Individuals Task, differ from conventional multiple-models problems only in
having a higher rate of Error NVC responses. This may be explicable as the con¬
sequence of subjects' (over-hasty) assumption that the Aristotelian generalisation,
that nothing follows from two negative premisses, holds for the Individuals Task.
5.3 Term order in the Individuals Task
As was discussed above, the Individuals Task makes an excellent testbed for hy¬
potheses about term ordering phenomena. This section presents preliminary anal¬
yses of Individuals Task term order phenomena. In part, these preliminary anal¬
yses reproduce work which has already appeared in Ardin (1991). However, the
main focus of the analyses presented here is on the novel question whether the
source/conditional distinction affects term order, and if so, what relation this ef¬
fect has to the Figural Effect. This material has been published in Yule & Stenning
(1992).
If a subject correctly draws a valid conclusion to a problem, we can determine
its source, providing that a unique source is defined for that conclusion to that
problem. We predict an association between source premiss and end-term order,
such that when the source is Premiss 1, a will precede c in the conclusion, and
when the source is Premiss 2, c will precede a. When either premiss could have
been the source, we make no prediction.
There is a set of problems which have two different individual conclusions, each
with a different source. These have an A premiss whose subject is an end term,
and an E premiss (e.g. AabEbc - Figure 5.3 shows the registration diagram).
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B B C
All A B No B C +A+B-C +C-B-A
Figure 5.3: Registration diagram for a problem with two valid individuals, each
with a different source.
Each of these individuals supports a different quantified conclusion, having only
one positive feature corresponding to an end term (e.g. +a±b—c supports Eac
(or Oac) and +c—b—a supports Eca (or Oca)). Since we cannot state a priori
which premiss will be source, we cannot predict an overall Figural Effect in these
problems, but we can test for an association between the source and term order,
since the source can be determined post hoc on the basis of the conclusion drawn.
Specifically, conclusions whose source is the A premiss should have the end term
from that premiss before the end term from the other, and conclusions whose
source is the E premiss should have the opposite end term order.
The dependency between source and end-term order should hold for problems
in all the Figures. In the ab/bc and ba/cb Figures the imbalance in numbers of
problems with Source 1 and 2 should give rise to an apparent effect of Figure:
ab/bc has more Source 1 problems, so it should show an overall ac bias, whereas
ba/cb, with more Source 2 problems, should show a ca bias. There are problems
in both the ab/cb and ba/bc Figures which have unique source, but owing to the
existence of complementary pairs of problems, with the same logic but inverted
premiss order, there should be no overall bias due to the distribution of source in
these Figures. The size of the diagonal effect can be estimated by assuming all
correct conclusions to be equally likely, then the relative numbers of conclusions
with each source premiss in the diagonal Figures predicts a small Figural bias in
the region of ±7-10% (depending how we count conclusions to the two-individual
problems).
The consequence of preservation of term order from the source premiss (or
indeed any founding premiss) in individual descriptions is that in each Figure, we
predict two dominant three-term orders out of the possible six, one founded on
each of the premiss orders which jointly constitute that Figure. Since these always
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Figure
ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc Overall
valid ac % 65.9 49.2 45.5 57.1 55.8
N 138 122 88 217 565
Individuals invalid ac % 73.0 39.7 64.9 72.2 61.2
Task N 63 63 57 36 219
Overall ac % 68.2 45.9 53.1 59.3 57.3
N 201 185 145 253 784
valid ac % 88.2 8.8 54.2 51.2 50.4
N 68 68 48 86 270
Standard invalid ac % 90.0 15.5 53.7 67.7 56.7
Task N 90 84 82 65 321
Overall ac % 89.2 12.5 53.8 58.3 53.8
N 158 152 130 151 591
Table 5.2: The Figural Effect in both tasks: percentages of valid and invalid
conclusions with ac term order in each Figure.
have the middle term b in first or second position, there should be few conclusions
with b final.
By contrast, Mental Models theory would presumably predict that all con¬
clusions will be in the forms abc and cba, with no instances of the middle term
occurring in either initial or final position. Also, the end-term order predictions
by Figure should specify mostly ac conclusions in ab/bc, mostly ca conclusions in
ba/cb and approximately equal numbers of ac and ca conclusions in ab/cb and
ba/bc. Crucially, Mental Models theory does not discriminate among problems
within Figures, since its explanation is solely in terms of Figure, whereas the
source-founding predictions are on a problem-by-problem basis
The most straightforward way to compare term order in the Individuals Task
with that in the Standard Task is to consider only the order in which the end
terms occur in individual descriptions. Tabulating the percentages of conclusions
in which a precedes c in the four Figures, for both valid and invalid conclusions, in
each Task, we derive Table 5.2, which shows the Individuals Task counterpart of
the Figural Effect. Taking account of a slight overall bias towards ac conclusions, it
is clear that there is an overall Individuals Task Figural Effect (x2(3) = 20.88, p <
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source
Premiss 1 Premiss 2 Both Overall
ac % 770 28i0 65?7 55.8
N 213 218 134 565
Table 5.3: The Source Effect in the Individuals Task: Percentages of valid con¬
clusions with ac order in first- and second-premiss unique source problems, and
non-unique source problems.
.0001) similar to the type reliably observed in Standard Task experiments2. It is
less pronounced for valid than for invalid conclusions, but is significant in both
cases [Valid: (x2(3) = 11.90, p < .0077), Invalid: (x2(3) = 18.16, p < .0004)].
For valid conclusions in the diagonal Figures, after taking account of an overall
ac bias of 6-8%, the size of the effect (±8-10%) is similar to that predicted by
the distribution of source in these Figures. The Standard Task Figural Effect is
more extreme than this. While the Figural Effect in valid conclusions arises in
part from the imbalance in numbers of valid conclusions with each term order in
the diagonal Figures, the size of the effect in invalid conclusions is also larger.
Table 5.3 shows how end-term order varies with source premiss. The Table
shows ac order for problems with unique source, problems in which both premisses
are source, and invalid conclusions. End-term order is strongly associated with
source (x2(2) = 118.1, p < 0.0001), such that a tends to precede c when the first
premiss is the source, and c tends to precede a when the second premiss is the
source, as predicted.
Table 5.4 shows the relation between end-term order and source premiss for all
of the the problems which establish two different individuals (e.g. Figure 5.3). On
the basis of the conclusion, we can determine whether the A or E premiss is the
source, and we predict that the end-term from the source premiss should precede
the end-term from the conditional premiss. As the Table shows, there are more
conclusions with the A premiss as source than with the E premiss as source, and
the end-term order is strongly predicted by the source premiss (Yates' x2(l) ==
2The use of x2with repeated measures data, as here, is liable to error; however, data are




End-term order A E Total
~AE 64 0 64~
EA 4 10 14
Total 68 10 78
Table 5.4: Association between end-term order and source premiss for valid con¬
clusions to problems which establish two individuals. End-term order is AE if the
end term from the A premiss precedes that from the E premiss.
Figure
ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
source 1 ac% 93.8 92.6 90.0 50.7
source 2 ca% 80.0 78.1 91.7 47.8
Table 5.5: Prediction of Individuals Task end-term order by source in each Figure
46.24, p < .0001).
Table 5.5 shows how well source predicts end-term order in each Figure. In
the first three Figures, source predicts end-term order very well, with more than
90% of problems with unique first-premiss source having ac conclusions; second-
premiss source predicts ca conclusions in these Figures slightly less well, but much
better than chance. Possibly this difference is attributable to the small overall
preference for ac conclusions. More seriously however, in ba/bc source does not
predict end-term order better than chance.
order
Figure bac bca abc cba acb cab N
ab/bc 7.5 23.9 59.2 3.5 1.5 4.5 201
ba/cb 37.3 6.5 4.3 44.3 4.3 3.2 185
ab/cb 13.1 4.1 36.6 35.2 3.4 7.6 145
ba/bc 52.6 35.6 5.5 3.2 1.2 2.0 253
Overall % 30.1 19.9 24.7 18.9 2.4 4.0 784
Table 5.6: Percentages of Individuals Task conclusions with each possible term
order in each Figure. Cells predicted to be the largest in each row are emboldened.
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The final predictions concern the novel data on the position of the b term in
individual descriptions. The hypothesis that individual descriptions are founded
on one of the premisses, followed by the end term of the other premiss, predicts
two orders in each Figure. Table 5.6 shows the percentages of responses with each
possible term order in each Figure, with the cells corresponding to each predicted
order emboldened. It is clear that in each case as predicted, the emboldened cells
do contain the highest proportions of responses, by a considerable margin. As
expected, there are few responses with b final, and responses with b initial are
slightly more frequent than those with b medial.
The preceding analyses show that for most of the relevant data, source premiss
is a good predictor of end-term order. The exception cases are in Figure ba/bc,
where the association is at the level of chance. Closer examination of individual
problems in this Figure reveals that when the conditional premiss has an A quan¬
tifier, slightly more individuals appear to be founded on the terms from the A
premiss, followed by the source end term, than are founded on the source premiss
in the manner predicted. Table B.3 in the Appendix shows an example set of
problems, two in the diagonal Figures and two in ba/bc. The first two, on the
left, are paradigmatic examples of the source effect (and the Figural Effect), while
the two on the right appear to invert the predictions of the source effect, for both
the Individuals and Standard Task data.
We call this tendency to found conclusions on the terms of the A premiss the
A-Effect, after that reported by Lee (1987), and as with source premiss, it can be
treated as a variable with three levels, (only) first and (only) second, and either
(covering the cases both and neither).
Table 5.7 shows the effects of having an "all' quantifier in the first and second
premiss respectively, on end-term order. The effect is highly significant and in
the predicted direction: when only premiss 1 has an "all" quantifier, there is a
majority of ac conclusions, when only Premiss 2 does, there is a majority of ca
conclusions, and there is a smaller ac majority in the remaining cases (x2(2) =
CO.2, p < 0.0001). Essentially the same observation has also been made by Ardin
(1991).
Clearly there are cases where a source premiss is also an A premiss, as in
Table 5.4, where both premisses are sources for different individuals, and as we
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A-effect
first second either Overall
ac% 71% 34% 62% 57%
N 190 193 401 784
Table 5.7: Experiment 2: Percentages of ac conclusions for each level of A-effect.
have seen, despite the strong association between source and end-term order in
these problems, most individuals specify the A premiss rather than the E premiss
as source here, so in this case the effects operate together. In other cases, as in
ba/bc problems, the effects are in opposition to one another. But these preliminary
analyses cannot resolve questions about the independence or otherwise of figural,
source and A-effects. To address such issues it is necessary to consider the variables




6.1 Model 1: The Individuals Task Figural Ef¬
fect
Loglinear modelling (see Dixon et al 1990) permits analyses involving multiple
variables simultaneously, to establish which variables account best for the observed
data, and which can be discarded. This allows a direct test of the hypothesis that
the source/conditional distinction accounts for end term order effects, and whether
explanations in terms of Figure are also required. However, one major caveat is
in order here, since strictly the technique is not applicable to repeated-measures
data such as the data described in this thesis. As a consequence, significance
levels in these analyses may be overestimated. Unfortunately, powerful statistical
modelling techniques which can take account of possibly correlated data are not
yet generally available, so strict adherence to the path of statistical righteousness
in this case would have made it impossible to consider the questions addressed
here at all. Readers can decide for themselves whether the results are sufficiently
interesting to warrant their inclusion.
The primary objective of Model 1 is to discover whether any main effect of Fig¬
ure remains, after taking into account the source effect and the A-effect. Modelling
can also test whether the observed breakdown of the source effect in ba/bc can
be explained by the A-effect. In this case there should be no interaction between
source and Figure. We also want to know whether source and A-effect interact or
are independent, and finally whether the A-effect interacts with Figure.
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partial association marginal association
effect d.f. x2 V iter d.f. x2 p iter
0. 1 16.64 0.0000
OS. 2 165.80 0.0000 5 2 121.31 0.0000 1
of. 3 5.03 0.1694 12 3 21.05 0.0001 1
oa. 2 122.27 0.0000 5 2 60.46 0.0000 1
osf. 6 20.37 0.0024 12 6 83.47 0.0000 5
osa. 4 0.91 0.9238 15 4 1.25 0.8695 10
ofa. 6 15.64 0.0158 8 6 30.90 0.0000 4
osfa. 7 16.48 0.0211
Table 6.1: Model 1: Partial and marginal associations for all terms involving
ordac. (Key: o=ordac; s=source; f=Figure; a=A-effect)
The multiway frequency tabulation used the dependent variable ordac, with
the levels ac and ca, and the independent variables Figure (levels ab/bc, ba/cb,
ab/cb and ba/bc), source (levels first, second and either), and A-effect (levels
first, second and either). Both source and A-effect collapse the "both" and
"neither" categories into the single category "either", for which no overall bias is
predicted. This allows the model to include all the individual conclusions, both
valid and invalid, and permits a multiway tabulation with few structural zeros.
Table 6.1 shows the partial and marginal associations for all terms involving
the dependent variable ordac1. Marginal associations give the significance of the
effect in marginal subtables, after summing over the levels of other variables not
included in the term. The marginal associations for the second-order terms os, oa
and of thus restate the findings of the preliminary analysis. The partial association
for a term of order n gives the difference in fit between the full model of order n
and the model not including that term.
For the main effects, then, we are interested in partial associations, and both
partial associations are highly significant for the terms os and oa, the main effects
of source and A-effect respectively. The partial association for of, the main
effect of Figure is not significant. We conclude that there is no main effect of
Figure. Deleting either of the terms os and oa from the model does affect its
goodness of fit, so even if of is included, it is still necessary to include os and oa.
1All interactions between independent variables are included in models automatically
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source first second either A-effect first second either
ac A 0.915 -1.003 0.088 ac A 0.577 -0.677 0.100
Table 6.2: Model 1: Loglinear parameters for source x ordac and A-effect x
ordac.
These effects therefore do appear to account for the apparent Figural Effect.
However, Figure does enter into higher-order interactions, with source and
with A-effect. Although the partial association of the term osfa is significant,
the simplest model with no significant lack of fit with the data is osf, ofa, sfa
(.LR X2(ll) = 17.38, p < 0.0971)2.
Loglinear parameters combine linearly to give the logarithm of the expected
value in each cell, so positive values increase the expected value, and larger values
increase the expected value more than do smaller values. As before, only param¬
eters for ac are presented (ac A), since ca parameters can be derived by negating
the ac ones.
The loglinear parameters for the model osf, ofa, sfa broadly confirm the hy¬
potheses. There is an overall bias toward ac conclusions (ordac ac A: 0.198),
and source strongly affects ordac in the predicted direction (Table 6.2), with
source=first biasing for ac conclusions, and source=second biasing for ca. No¬
tably, when source=either, there is negligible ac bias. Similarly A-effect is
strong and in the predicted directions, and as with source, the ac bias when
A-effect=either is small.
The term osa does not occur in the model, so the source effect is apparently
independent of the A-effect. We had hypothesised that the apparent interaction
between source and Figure could be accounted for in terms of the A-effect.
However, even after taking account of A-effect, a significant interaction between
source and Figure still remains (osf).
The insignificant main effect of Figure on ordac is shown in Table 6.3. The
significant osf interaction is shown in Table 6.4. On the basis of the size of
the parameters, the interaction is most pronounced in ba/bc, where there is a
2Since this is a hierarchical model, it includes all component lower-order terms, i.e. o, os,
of, oa, osf, ofa and all the independent variable terms.
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Figure ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
ac A 0.218 -0.065 -0.120 -0.034
Table 6.3: Model 1: Loglinear parameters for the insignificant Figure x ordac
effect.
ac A Figure
source ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
first 0.208 0.163 0.139 -0.510
second -0.026 0.094 -0.326 0.258
either -0.182 -0.258 0.187 0.253
Table 6.4: Model 1: Loglinear parameters for the source x Figure x ordac
effect.
substantial countereffect to the main effect of source. It appears that the A-
effect has failed adequately to account for this. The next largest discrepancy is in
ab/cb, where there appears to be an enhancement of the predicted source effect.
In comparison with the overall source effect, parameter sizes are small.
Finally, Table 6.5 shows the interaction between Figure and A-effect. The
largest deviations occur in Figures ab/cb and ba/bc, when A-efFect is first or
second, and can be summarised as a reduction in the normal A-efFect in ab/cb
and an increase in it in ba/bc.
Discussion In the model of end-term order, there are highly significant main
effects of source and A-efFect, but no main effect of Figure. This indicates that











Table 6.5: Model 1: Loglinear parameters for A-efFect x Figure x ordac.
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terms of the source effect and A-Effect. However Figure interacts significantly
with both source and A-effect, indicating discrepancies in the symmetrical Fig¬
ures.
One possible explanation for the discrepant results in the symmetrical Figures
is that they are in some way connected with the position of the middle term
in individual conclusions. Note that the forms of the source and A-effect x
Figure interactions are approximate inverses of one another, and that the relevant
difference between the Figures concerned is that the middle term is never subject
when source predicts ordac best and is always subject when source predicts
ordac worst. It was shown in Chapter 5 that the position of the middle term in
conclusions is related to its position in premisses, such that it is usually first in
ba/bc problems, usually second in ab/cb problems, and either first or second in
the diagonal Figures. The next model examines the relation of premiss grammar
to the variables already considered, in the determination of three-term order.
6.2 Model 2: Three-term order effects
The next model adopts a very different approach to modelling the effects of source.
The source x Figure x ordac interaction discovered in the previous analysis
suggests that the main source and A-effect are dependent on premiss grammar,
since this varies appropriately with Figure. Consequently two new variables, sr-
cgram (source premiss grammar) and condgram (conditional premiss grammar)
are defined, to replace Figure. The aim of this analysis is to give an account of
the ordering of all three terms in individual conclusions.
The analysis uses only valid conclusions to problems with unique source pre¬
misses (diagram types vpl, vp3, vnl, vn3, vn4, vn5 and vu2 - see Table A.l in
Appendix A.l). The multiway frequency tabulation uses the independent variables
source (first/second), srcgram (source grammar: endsubj/midsubj), condgram
(conditional premiss grammar: endsubj/midsubj) and condq (the quantifier of the
conditional premiss: all/none) against the dependent variable order (order of all
three terms in the individual: abc, bac, cba, bca). Owing to sparsity of data, the
9 valid conclusions with term b final are omitted.
The main overall hypothesis is that individuals will be constructed by taking
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partial association marginal association
effect d.f. x2 V iter d.f. x2 V iter
0. 3 2.13 0.5460
OS. 3 183.57 0.0000 19 3 186.46 0.0000 1
og. 3 321.16 0.0000 8 3 316.50 0.0000 1
oc. 3 5.69 0.1275 20 3 10.60 0.0141 1
oq. 3 4.30 0.2311 21 3 1.51 0.6809 1
osg. 3 48.40 0.0000 35 3 59.75 0.0000 11
osc. 3 15.92 0.0012 68 3 42.88 0.0000 8
osq. 3 40.13 0.0000 33 3 69.00 0.0000 7
ogc. 3 2.89 0.4084 42 3 1.60 0.6601 17
ogq. 3 2.20 0.5317 49 3 6.57 0.0870 17
ocq. 5 8.74 0.1198 10 5 26.60 0.0001 4
osgc. 1 0.39 0.5343 100 8 12.41 0.1340 22
osgq. 1 1.96 0.1610 100 6 7.38 0.2870 19
oscq. 1 0.09 0.7704 100 4 5.25 0.2629 25
ogcq. 0 0.00 1.0000 75 4 4.88 0.3000 7
osgcq. 0 0.02 1.0000
Table 6.6: Model 2: Partial and marginal associations for all terms involving
order. (Key: o=order; s=source; g=srcgram; c=condgram; q=condq)
the terms from one (founding) premiss in order, and adding the remaining end
term from the other premiss last. Therefore, similar main effects of srcgram and
condgram are predicted, such that midsubj biases for conclusions with the mid¬
dle term first, while endsubj biases for conclusions with the middle term second.
There should be a tendency for the founding premiss to be the source premiss,
so when the source is the first premiss, biases towards conclusions in which a
precedes c are expected, and when the source is the second premiss, there should
be biases towards conclusions in which c precedes a. The presence of the variable
condq allows us to take account of the A-Effect, by allowing the effect of source
to interact with the quantifier of the conditional premiss. In view of the consid¬
erations raised at the end of the last section, interactions between the grammar
variables and source should also be evident.
Table 6.6 shows the marginal and partial associations for this analysis. The
simplest model with no significant lack of fit is osg, osc, osq, sgcq (LR x2(21) =
30.17, p < 0.0886). This includes the interactions srcgram x source x order,
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source order
abc bac cba bca
first 0.751 0.105 -0.698 -0.157
second -0.751 -0.105 0.698 0.157
Table 6.7: Model 2: Loglinear parameters for the source x order effect.
condq order
abc bac cba bca
all 0.021 -0.042 0.173 -0.153
none -0.021 0.042 -0.173 0.153
Table 6.8: Model 2: Loglinear parameters for the condq x order effect.
condgram x source x order and condq x source x order, as well as their
component lower-order effects.
Table 6.7 shows the main effect of source. While the parameters predicted to
be positive do turn out to be positive, the association is greater when the middle
term occurs in medial position than when it occurs in initial position.
No prediction is made for the insignificant condq x order effect (Table 6.8),
and the observed parameters are small. However, Table 6.9 shows how condq
interacts with the effect of source—when the conditional quantifier is "none",
the pattern of parameters resembles that predicted for the main effect of source,
whereas when the conditional quantifier is "all", this pattern is inverted. This
suppression of the predicted source x order effect when the conditional quantifier
is "all" is an expression of the A-effect.
condq source order
abc bac cba bca
all first -0.558 -0.562 0.717 0.403
second 0.558 0.562 -0.717 -0.403
none first 0.558 0.562 -0.717 -0.403
second -0.558 -0.562 0.717 0.403
Table 6.9: Model 2: Loglinear parameters for the source x condq x order effect.
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srcgram order
abc bac cba bca
endsubj 0.722 -1.020 1.130 -0.832
midsubj -0.722 1.020 -1.130 0.832









Table 6.11: Model 2: Loglinear parameters for the condgram x order effect.
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the main effects of srcgram and condgram respec¬
tively. In both cases, endsubj biases for abc and cba, and midsubj biases for bac
and bca, as predicted. However the parameters for the srcgram x order effect
are considerably larger than those for the condgram x order effect.
The presence of the source x srcgram interaction (Table 6.12) shows that
source does not combine linearly with srcgram to determine term order, but
rather each combination picks out one particular term order.
Table 6.13 shows the source x condgram interaction. I interpret this as






















abc bac cba bca
-0.511 0.489 0.399 -0.378
0.511 -0.489 -0.399 0.378
0.511 -0.489 -0.399 0.378
-0.511 0.489 0.399 -0.378
Table 6.13: Model 2: Loglinear parameters for the source x condgram x order
effect.
Discussion The three-term model can be interpreted as showing that conclu¬
sions are usually founded on one of the premisses, such that the terms from that
premiss tend to occur first in order, followed by the remaining end term. There is
a tendency for the founding premiss to be the source, however this effect is reduced
when the conditional premiss has an 'All' quantifier.
The coverage of this model is rather restricted; the previous model covered all
Individual conclusions, whereas here only those valid conclusions with a determi¬




7.1 A-effect in the Standard task
7.1.1 Model 3: The Durham Content Experiment
As with the Individuals Task data, it is possible to analyse Standard Task data
by constructing loglinear models of the effects of A-effect and Figure on ordac,
so a multiway frequency tabulation is constructed. However, owing to the uncon¬
vertible nature of many Standard Task conclusions, the effects of source cannot
be separated from the effects of validity, so source is not included in the analy¬
sis. Since we are primarily interested in cases with only one A premiss, A-effect
has the levels first, second and none, the final level covering cases with two A
premisses and cases without any A premiss, included for better overall parameter
estimates. Since this data set includes the manipulation of contentfulness, the
variable content is included to increase the power of the analysis.
Table 7.1 shows the marginal and partial associations for all effects in the
tabulation. The largest effect is of, the Figural Effect, but there are also significant
partial associations for oa and oaf. The ofc partial association is barely significant
at the 0.05 level, so two models were fit, with and without this effect. The first,
oaf, afc has no significant lack of fit with the data, (x2(12) = 19.24, p = 0.083),
as does the second, oaf, ofc, ofc (x2(8) — 10.40, p = 0.2381), so the effect ofc is
not required. Consequently it is necessary only to consider the model oaf, afc.
Table 7.2 shows the loglinear parameters for the Figural Effect. This is large
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partial association marginal association
effect d.f. A2 V iter d.f. x2 P iter
0. 1 3.43 0.0640
oa. 2 11.18 0.0037 6 2 15.69 0.0004 1
of. 3 204.26 0.0000 3 3 208.81 0.0000 1
oc. 1 0.31 0.5802 5 1 0.31 0.5786 1
oaf. 6 53.86 0.0000 7 6 53.50 0.0000 5
oac. 2 0.16 0.9239 5 2 0.01 0.9949 3
ofc. 3 8.17 0.0426 8 3 7.86 0.0489 6
oafc. 6 10.24 0.1148
Table 7.1: Model 3: Partial and marginal associations for all terms involving
ordac. {Key: o=ordac; a=A-effect; f=Figure; c=content)
Figure ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
ac A 0.951 -1.065 -0.037 0.151
Table 7.2: Model 3: Loglinear parameters for ordac x Figure.
and it closely replicates the Figural effect described by Johnson-Laird et at ab/bc
problems strongly predispose ac conclusions, whereas ba/cb problems strongly
predispose ca conclusions, and there is little overall bias in the symmetrical Figures
ab/cb and ba/bc.
Table 7.3 shows the overall A-effect. This is relatively small in comparison
with the Figural Effect, and it shows a tendency for the end term from the A
premiss to precede the other end term in conclusions, i.e. if the A premiss is first,
the conclusion tends to be ac whereas if the A premiss is second, the conclusion
tends to be ca. In the 'none' condition there is little overall effect.
Table 7.4 shows the ordac x A-effect x Figure effect. Most of this effect is
concerned with the symmetrical Figures, when there is a first or second premiss A-
A-effect first second none
ac A 0.119 -0.202 0.082












Table 7.4: Model 3: Loglinear parameters for ordac x A-effect x Figure.
partial association marginal association
effect d.f. x2 V iter d.f. x2 P iter
o. 1 54.83 0.0000
oa. 2 12.14 0.0023 9 2 10.40 0.0055 1
of. 3 517.08 0.0000 4 3 512.40 0.0000 1
ox. 1 15.69 0.0001 7 1 9.74 0.0018 1
oaf. 6 98.53 0.0000 7 6 99.88 0.0000 6
oax. 2 2.60 0.2723 6 2 2.68 0.2616 3
ofx. 3 8.10 0.0440 10 3 11.79 0.0081 9
oafx. 6 5.90 0.4349
Table 7.5: Model 4: Partial and marginal associations for all terms involving
ordac. {Key: o=ordac; a=A-effect; f=Figure; x=experiment
effect. In short, the A-effect is suppressed or reversed in ab/cb, but it is enhanced
in ba/bc. This effect is quite substantial, and considerably outweighs the overall
A-effect in size.
7.1.2 Model 4: The Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) experi¬
ments
We can make similar tabulations with the data tabulated in Johnson-Laird &
Bara (1984). These tables omit 'outliers' in the form of unpredicted (by Mental
Models theory) incorrect single responses to particular problems, but otherwise
are complete. The data are from the 10 second condition of experiment 1, and the
third experiment. The variables are ordac, A-effect, Figure and experiment
(10s/exp3).
Table 7.5 shows the partial and marginal associations for all terms in the anal-
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Figure ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
ac A 1.103 -1.042 -0.211 0.150
Table 7.6: Model 4: Loglinear parameters for ordac x Figure.
A-effect first second none
ac A -0.159 0.001 0.158
Table 7.7: Model 4: Loglinear parameters for ordac x A-efFect.
ysis. There are significant partial associations for the main ordac, the interactions
ordac x Figure, ordac x A-efFect and ordac x experiment, and the higher-
order ordac x A-efFect x Figure. Although there is a marginally significant in¬
teraction ordac x Figure x experiment, this is not required for a good fit: the
model oaf, ox, afx has no significant lack of fit (LR x2(H) = 17.19, p < 0.1024).
The parameters for this analysis show an overall bias toward ac responses
(ac:0.301,ca:-0.301), and as is well known, there is also a clear Figural Effect (see
Table 7.6). The ordac x xpt effect has only one degree of freedom, and so is
untabulated, but it shows that the 10s condition has a higher bias toward ac
responses than the untimed experiment 3 (ac A=0.178).
The effects involving A-efFect are shown in Tables 7.7 (overall A-efFect) and
7.8 (interaction with Figure). Unlike the Durham experiment, there is no clear
overall A-effect; while there is a difference between conditions, it is between 'first'
and 'none', with an A-premiss first tending to increase the number of ca responses
(Cf the Durham experiment, where the end term from the A premiss precedes
that from the other overall).







ab/bc ba/cb ab/cb ba/bc
-0.045 0.073 -0.771 0.743
-0.032 -0.114 0.784 -0.637
0.078 0.041 -0.012 -0.106
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However, Table 7.8 shows a very similar pattern to that which was observed
in the Durham experiment (Cf Table 7.4). As before, in Figure ba/bc the end
term from the A premiss tends to precede the other, whereas in Figure ab/cb the
end term from the non-A premiss tends to precede that from the A premiss. The
other parameters in the table are comparatively small.
7.2 Errors and the A-Effect
The results of the preceding two analyses suggest that the largest and most impor¬
tant effects of A-premisses on end term order occur in the symmetrical Figures,
such that in ba/bc the end term from an A premiss tends to occur before the
other end term, whereas in ab/cb this effect is reversed. This effect is consider¬
ably larger than any overall A-effect, and replicates reliably between experiments.
The overall A-effect does not even appear to have the same direction in the two
analyses. While it might be expected that ab/bc and ba/cb would show com¬
plementary cancelling effects, thus reducing the overall A-effect, the interactions
with Figure do not bear this out. The interaction is similar to that found in the
end-term order model of the Individuals Task data.
The three-term model shows that as well as the predicted founding of con¬
clusions on the source premiss, there is also a competing tendency to found con¬
clusions on A premisses. We note that one way of discriminating the difficult
NVC problems is in terms of whether they have A premisses (see the disussion
of problem difficulty in the two tasks, in Section 5.2). It is possible that a single
mechanism could explain both these phenomena, for example a solution strategy
which is unsound in general but yields valid conclusions in many cases.
While the unsound heuristics most frequently discussed in the literature, such
as the Atmosphere Effect (Woodworth & Sells 1935; Revlis 1975) and Matching
(Wetherick 1989; Wetherick & Gilhooly 1990) cannot be easily applied to the case
of the Individuals Task, since a major component of these concerns quantifier
selection, the Conversion Hypothesis (Chapman & Chapman 1959; Revlis 1975;
Newstead 1989, 1990) is straightforwardly applicable. The Individual Identifica¬
tion Algorithm can be adapted to make conversion errors simply by changing the
characteristic representations of premisses. In graphical terms, this is achieved by
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using a single circle to represent both terms of the A premiss—this strategy would
generate correct answers to problems with A premisses and valid conclusions, but
would yield extra invalid conclusions in npl, np2, nnl and nn2. However, the IIA
Conversion Hypothesis cannot, in itself, account for the A-effect on term order,
because there is no reason to expect that processing would not proceed in the
usual, source-first fashion; even in a natural deduction system, since conversion
changes the order of the terms of the conditional premiss, it is not obvious that
this would lead to any term order effects different from those predicted by the
source-founding hypothesis.
Another possible explanation derives from previous work on the Individuals
Task dataset. Yule (1991) demonstrated that the majority of error individuals
could be construed as simple unifications of the critical individuals from the two
premisses. This tendency was most marked in problems with at least one A pre¬
miss. Thus with premisses "All As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs", the A premiss
provides the critical individual +A+B, which is simply unified with the critical
individual from the I premiss, if possible (i.e. provided the middle term features
match in polarity), to give the erroneous conclusion -f-A-f-B+C. We can call this
operation Minimal Linking, and obviously it will often return the valid conclu¬
sion. For example, provided the middle terms match, and the conditional is an A
premiss, Minimal Linking will usually return the valid conclusion if one exists. In
such cases, if no valid conclusion exists, the Minimal Linking conclusion will be
the same as that predicted by conversion.
The Minimal Linking Hypothesis is distinguishable from the Conversion Hy¬
pothesis because it does not predict errors in nn2 problems (e.g. All B A, Some
C not B), since the middle terms do not match in polarity, but in the other
NVC problem types its predictions are the same. Furthermore, it can naturally
accommodate the term-order effects, since the strategy does not depend on a
source/conditional distinction, so all else being equal, conditional-founded indi¬
viduals would be expected to be as likely as source-founded ones.
Unfortunately, nn2 differs in another respect from the rest of the problem types
in which conversion theory predicts errors; we can think of the two categories as
Modus Ponens problems (npl, np2 and nnl) and Modus Tollens problems (nn2). In
valid Modus Ponens problems, the terms in the conclusion have the same polarity
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Problem Error Conversion A Source
Type Inds Attributable founded founded
npl (1) 11 9 (7)
np2 (4) 36 36 17 4
nnl (2) 22 21 19 0
nn2 (2) 15 4 0 3
Table 7.9: Errors attributable to conversion.
as their occurrences in the A premiss, whereas in Modus Tollens problems, the
terms in the conclusion are the negations of their occurrences in the A premiss.
Minimal Linking concludes that there is no valid conclusion for Modus Tollens
problems on the grounds that the polarity of the middle term is different in the
two premisses, which is why it doesn't find the conversion conclusion in nn2.
Valid Modus Tollens problems are generally much harder for human subjects
than Modus Ponens problems; the only valid cases are the vn5 problems and the E-
source conclusions to the vnl problems, which are among the hardest conclusions
for human subjects to find (see Figure 5.2 in Section 5.2). Consequently, the invalid
conversion conclusions in nn2 might be expected, on purely empirical grounds, to
be "harder" too. Subjects who think conversion of A premisses is legitimate are
hardly likely to appreciate the validity of Modus Tollens.
With this in mind, we can look at the relevant data. Table 7.9 shows, for
each of the problems concerned, the total number of error individuals, numbers of
error individuals which can be attributed to conversion (and therefore to Minimal
Linking where appropriate), and finally the numbers of conversion-attributable
individuals which are either A-founded or source-founded (in the usual sense that
the terms from the appropriate premiss occur in order before the remaining end
term).
For the first three problem types, almost all error individuals (96%) are at¬
tributable to conversion, whereas for the Modus Tollens problem type nn2, only
27% of error individuals are attributable to conversion. In the case of problem type
npl, A-founding is indistinguishable from source-founding, but for problem types
np2 and nnl, 63% of conversion-attributable problems are A-founded, whereas
only 7% are source-founded. By contrast, no nn2 conversion-attributable conclu-
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sions are A-founded, and 75% are source-founded.
Despite the large difference between nn2 and the rest of the problem types
in terms of the number of error individuals which are attributable to conversion,
as we have seen the Modus Ponens/Modus Tollens distinction is a possible con¬
found. However the fact that a majority of conversion-attributable conclusions
are A-founded is inexplicable in terms of the Conversion Hypothesis, while it is
compatible with the Minimal Linking Hypothesis, so on balance it would appear
that the Minimal Linking hypothesis is preferable.
Supposing that there is some tendency among the subject population to use
Minimal Linking can then explain why the Modus Tollens problems are so difficult,
since they are insoluble by Minimal Linking.
One final observation is that for the core problem types in the diagonal Figures,
the invalid conclusions predicted by the minimal linking hypothesis are all Figural
ones, so this hypothesis predicts an Invalid Conclusions' Figural Effect. As a
consequence, estimates of the overall A-effect in the Standard Task analyses may





There is a need for an idealised theory of syllogistic competence in the literature;
many theories make reference to an unspecified logical process to explain much of
the variance, and to provide a backdrop against which to articulate an account
of errors. The Atmosphere Effect (Woodworth & Sells 1935, Sells 1936, Revlis
1975), Matching (Wetherick & Gilhooly 1990) and Illicit Conversion (Chapman
& Chapman 1959, Revlis 1975) all work this way, and all neglect to specify the
putative logical process. If this type of appeal is to be plausible, it must be
assumed that some subjects are able to produce most or all valid conclusions easily,
quickly and perhaps reliably. The inherent difficulty of primitively interpreted
Euler Circles or even Mental Models makes both of them unsuitable candidates,
whereas the Individual Identification Algorithm is simple enough to fulfil this role.
The IIA can be viewed as an abstraction of Erickson's (1974, 1978) and Guyote
& Sternberg's (1981) Euler Circles, and of Johnson-Laird et aVs Mental Models
theories. For this reason it tends to subsume these theories—they all expect
even error conclusions to be logically consistent with the premisses, for example,
and the IIA can degenerate into a Mental Models scenario with multiple models
causing performance decrements. Its intimate relation with a realistic construal
of the use of Euler Circles is also a major strength; real subjects do not draw
lots of combinations of circles, and they don't select premiss representations and
combinations randomly (Ford 1994, Newstead 1989, 1990, Yule 1991).
A major aim of this thesis has been to explain how a model like the IIA can
account for another well-known empirical effect, the Figural Effect (Johnson-Laird
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& Bara 1984). Chapter 3 showed that the Individual Identification Algorithm can
be implemented in a variety of superficially different ways, but that in each case
a functional distinction can be drawn between source and conditional premisses.
The distinction relates to the role played by each premiss in inference: the source
asserts the existence of a critical individual, which can be considered the subject
of the syllogism, whereas the conditional provides the means to infer something
about that critical individual—to predicate something of it.
The source/conditional distinction is closely related to term order effects in the
Individuals Task data, in such a way that terms from source premisses tend to pre¬
cede those from conditional premisses in conclusions. Moreover, this can explain
the apparent effect of Figure on end-term order, via the imbalance in numbers of
problems with each source/conditional assignment in the diagonal Figures. Model
1 demonstrated that, in conjunction with the A-effect, the source/conditional dis¬
tinction can account for the figural variance in end-term order. Model 2 showed
that three-term order of conclusions can be explained as the result of taking the
terms from one (founding) premiss in order, and adding the remaining term last.
This founding premiss tends to be the source premiss, but this tendency is reduced
when the conditional quantifier is "all".
The source-founding hypothesis not only accounts for gross figural end-term
order effects, but in three out of four Figures, predicts term order accurately on a
problem-by-problem basis. In ab/cb, although there is indeed an approximately
50/50 split between ac and ca responses in the Individuals Task data, the source-
founding hypothesis predicts which problems will produce ac responses and which
will produce ca responses. Neither Mental Models theory nor Wetherick's gram¬
matical formulation (Wetherick 1989, Wetherick & Gilhooly 1990), which as we
have seen make equivalent predictions, can explain these strong biases.
The A-effect reflects a tendency in some circumstances to found conclusions
on conditional premisses. This seems to be most common in ba/bc problems,
and evidence for the effect can be found in Standard Task datasets as well as the
Individuals Task dataset.
Moreover, comparison of error rates in Standard Task and Individuals Task
data suggests that the main cause of difficulty in the Standard Task is selection
of an appropriate quantifier for the conclusion, and that this may account for the
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apparent effect of the number of Mental Models required. This result concurs
with the conclusions of Ford (1994) and Wetherick & Gilhooly (1990). While
there is a difference in difficulty between single- and multiple-models problems in
the Individuals Task data, it is possible that this is attributable to an unsound
solution strategy called Minimal Linking, which is hypothesised to occur, along
with a logically sound strategy, in the data at large. Minimal Linking can in turn
explain the A-effect.
As it stands, the Minimal Linking Hypothesis requires further investigation.
The strategy is similar to Matching (Wetherick 1989), and the latter has been
found to be attributable to a subgroup of subjects. It might be expected that
Minimal Linking would follow a similar pattern, and this could be assessed by
attempting to identify Linking subjects, for example by selecting those subjects
whose Linking scores on the identifying set of NVC problems is highest. Linking
subjects should score badly on Modus Tollens problems such as vn5 problems,
but quite well on Modus Ponens problems, whereas Logical subjects should score
better on vn5 problems. Such a partitioning of the subject group would allow
the fitting of different models to the Logical and Linking subjects; the hypothesis
would be that Logical subjects would not show evidence of an A-effect, whereas
Linking subjects should show less evidence of a source effect.
While the success in predicting end term order by the source/conditional dis¬
tinction might appear to lend confirmation to the Individual Identification Algo¬
rithm, it should be stressed that the distinction appears to be more general than
this. Its relation to the much more universal logical distinction between existen¬
tial, assertive statements and conditional, inference-licensing statements tends to
undercut the suggestion that subjects really use the IIA. It is quite possible that
even the Logical subjects use a variety of different reasoning systems; the depth
and universality of the source/conditional distinction could result in an overall
source effect and hence a Figural Effect nevertheless.
On the other hand, provided that sources of error can be accounted for by
things like the Linking strategy, the lack of evidence for a single/multiple models
distinction may license a stronger interpretation of the involvement of the IIA. It
is, after all, a one-model theory in Mental Models terms, and so it might appear
to make a prediction of no differences in difficulty, all else being equal. How-
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ever, as Section 3.3.1 showed, the situation is not really as simple as this; even
a strongly-held IIA hypothesis need not predict uniform performance—a version
of the IIA which permited non-maximal registration would behave very like the
Mental Models algorithm, since it would then be necessary to consider multiple
distinct combined representations of premisses, with a consequently heavier mem¬
ory load. Indeed, the number of individuals in a single registration diagram might
cause differential memory load. It would be necessary to take account of Minimal
Linking before such questions could be addressed for putative "Logical" subjects
alone.
While this study has concentrated primarily on explanation of the results of
the Individuals Task, it is possible to extrapolate to the case of the Standard
Task. Thus the preference for Figural convertible conclusions is straightforwardly
explicable by the source/conditional distinction, and this can also explain the
facilitation of Figural unconvertible unique-source problems. Unfortunately it is
very hard directly to test for source/conditional effects in the Standard Task, owing
to the confound with validity effects, and most valid Standard Task conclusions are
unconvertible. When they are convertible, it can be problematic to assign source
and conditional premisses -— problems with two valid individuals (vnl problems)
have two "none" conclusions, and since these are validly convertible, in principle
each could be derived from either valid individual.
In the Individuals Task, syntax and semantics of conclusions are independent,
and assignment of source and conditional premisses to valid individual conclusions
depends purely on the semantics of the individual description, not the order of
mention of terms, so it is possible to test for the effect of source/conditional assign¬
ment on term order without assuming what was to be proven. The methodological
assumption that is made is that if a conclusion is valid, it is meaningful to assign
source and conditional premisses to it. This would not be true if the conclusion
was actually reached by means of a reasoning process that did not distinguish
source and conditional premisses, such as Mental Models (Johnson-Laird 1983).
The procedure of source/conditional assignment is justified only to the extent that
it works empirically, to predict term order.
For valid individual conclusions, notwithstanding these reservations, it is fairly
straightforward to assign source and conditional premisses. However, if the dis-
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tinction was to be applied to invalid conclusions, it would be necessary to amend
the definitions somewhat; strictly speaking, source is defined only for valid conclu¬
sions. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory principled way of assigning source and
conditional premisses for invalid conclusions, since allowing for both non-maximal
registration and premiss misrepresentation renders almost all such assignments
indeterminate. It would be necessary to restrict the range of possible sources of
error, for example to permit premiss misrepresentation but assume perfect combi¬
nation of premisses, before a suitable extended definition would be useful. Because
this would introduce empirical commitments into the definitions, thereby robbing
them of their a priori character, I am reluctant to do this.
As we have seen, however, the statistical model of end-term order effects ac¬
counted for the total (valid and invalid) Figural Effect. This was achieved by
pooling all invalid conclusions, as well as valid conclusions with indeterminate
source, into a single category ("either") for which no prediction was made on
the basis of source/conditional assignment. This allowed the variable A-efFect
to range over the largest possible dataset, since this variable is well-defined for
both valid and invalid conclusions. On the basis of that analysis, it appears that
the A-effect must have been sufficient to account for the Figural Effect in invalid
conclusions.
Indeed, term ordering in invalid Linking conclusions is more strongly biased
towards A-founding than would be expected on the basis of the Minimal Linking
hypothesis given in Chapter 5.7, which simply predicts an approximately equal
number of source-founded and conditional-founded conclusions. Empirically, it
seems that Linking subjects prefer to start with the A premiss. Ardin (1991) has
reported evidence from a syllogism recall study that an A premiss will tend to be
recalled as the first premiss in the syllogism, irrespective of its original position,
and argued that subjects appeared to prefer to start processing with a positive
or universal premiss. The Individuals Task term ordering data was explained
as the consequence of this—positive terms tended to appear first, followed by
negative ones. Unfortunately Ardin's account falls short of explaining Figural
Effect phenomena in syllogisms with two positive premisses, which are usually
given as paradigms of the effect.
While in the present study the A-effect was an unexpected discovery of the
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model building process, characterised primarily in terms of performance deviations
from the predictions of the source/conditional hypothesis, it has appeared before
in the literature on syllogistic reasoning. Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) discuss
a similarly unpredicted phenomenon concerning the ab/cb and ba/bc Figures,
writing
"where the conclusion was in the same mood as just one of the premises,
the end term of the premise tended to play the same grammatical role
in the conclusion as it did in the premise itself" (p22)
We can call this the same-mood/same-position effect.
If we restrict ourselves, for now, to considering only valid conclusions, it should
be clear that the premiss with the same mood as the conclusion must be the
source premiss, and the conditional premiss must have an "all" quantifier, or else
the mood of the conclusion would differ from that of the source. So the effect
translates into the claim that in ab/cb, the subject (i.e. the end term) from the
source premiss becomes the subject of the conclusion, as would be expected on
the basis of the source-founding hypothesis, whereas in ba/bc, the predicate of the
source (again the end term) becomes the predicate of the conclusion, instead of
becoming the subject of the conclusion as would be predicted by source-founding.
Thus the end term from the conditional becomes the subject of the conclusion in
ba/bc. This is exactly what was found in the present study—in the Individuals
Task and both Standard Task datasets, there was an interaction between A-effect,
Figure and end term order such that an end term from an A premiss was more
likely to precede the other end term in the conclusion in ba/bc, but less likely to
do so in ab/cb.
Both Lee (1987) and Ford (1994) argue that extending the same-mood/same-
position effect to the diagonal Figures would generate the Figural Effect, so per¬
haps the symmetrical- and diagonal-Figure effects have a common cause. Again,
this leads to predictions which parallel those of source-founding to a large extent,
for the same reasons. The same-mood/same-position account has the strength
that it correctly predicts end term order in conclusions in all four Figures, un¬
like the source-founding account which needs to be supplemented by the A-effect.
However, source-founding also covers cases where the mood of the source is not
the same as the mood of the conclusion (different-mood conclusions), but in the
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Some B A +B+A
All B C +B+C
(+B+C)+A
Some A not B +A-B
All C B -C-B
+A(-C-B)
Figure 8.1: Individual Identification by "substitution".
Standard Task, as we have seen, subjects typically find it difficult to draw different-
mood conclusions, so such cases would be expected to have less effect on the overall
statistics. In any event, in the Standard Task, valid different-mood conclusions
usually have the "some... not" quantifier, so they are not validly convertible any¬
way, and their end-term order can be attributed to the "validity effect".
Ford's (1994) examination of subjects' protocols revealed that both verbal
and spatial reasoners showed the same-mood/same-position effect in the diago¬
nal Figures, although only verbal reasoners showed it in the symmetric Figures.
Ford explains the 'verbal' result as the consequence of substitution of conditional
premiss terms for the middle term in the source premiss, to generate the same-
mood/same-position effect. In ab/cb, substituting into the source keeps the source
end term first, while in ba/bc, substituting into the source leaves the source end
term in last place. Reliance on substitution in this way also explains the observed
difficulty of drawing different-mood conclusions.
While substitution accounts quite well for end-term order results in the Stan¬
dard Task, it is not straightforwardly applicable to the Individuals Task, since the
conclusion is never derivable from either of the premisses by substitution, because
there is no cancellation of the middle term. But it is possible to construct a formal
analogue which parallels it reasonably closely—the idea is to perform the substi¬
tution with individuals, rather than premisses. Simply replace the middle term
in the source premiss' critical individual with both terms from the appropriate
individual from the conditional premiss' maximal model, in their original order.
Note that the logic of the process is just the same as the usual IIA, using the
unification test, but the syntax differs. In the examples in Figure 8.1, the con¬
ditional premiss individual displayed is the only one which is unifiable with the
source premiss critical individual.
Although this approach might appear to account for the observed term order
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results in ba/bc, since it generates the A-effect in that Figure, it also generates only
abc and cba orders in the diagonal Figures, and cab and acb orders in ab/cb. The
orders predicted for the Diagonal Figures are commoner than would be expected
on the source-founding hypothesis alone, but there are also substantial numbers
of conclusions with the middle term first in these Figures, and these are predicted
only by the source-founding hypothesis. Conclusions with the middle term last,
as predicted by Substitution for ab/cb, are very rare. Moreover, as we have seen,
the source-founding hypothesis has problems only when the conditional quantifier
is "all"; when the conditional quantifier is "none", the source-founding hypothesis
predicts term order quite accurately. So as things stand, Substitution does not
fare well as an explanation of Individuals Task term order.
Ford's explanation for the same-mood/same-position effect, as the consequence
of substitution, is applicable only to the 'verbal' subjects. Her 'spatial' sub¬
jects also showed evidence of a same-mood/same-position effect in diagonal-Figure
problems, but not in symmetric-Figure problems. This may be explicable as the
consequence of source-founding; unfortunately the published data are insufficient
to determine whether this is the case. It would be interesting to conduct a repli¬
cation of the Individuals Task experiment using Ford's "thinking aloud" method¬
ology.
The middle term position results raise problems not only for substitution, but
also, of course, for the Mental Models account of the Figural Effect. It is hard
to see how Mental Models theory could predict anything other than abc and cba
orders in the Individuals Task. The reason for this is that reordering of terms is
crucial to the integration of information from the premisses in the Mental Models
account—the middle terms must be brought together to construct the mental
model. The present account, in determining term order largely on the basis of
surface grammar, makes it clear that term order is not crucial to reasoning; rather
the order of terms in conclusions appears to be no more than an accidental trace
left by a reasoning process which is fundamentally indifferent to term and premiss
order, being driven by logical properties of the premisses instead.
It might be argued that a FIFO store underlies the preservation of order from
founding premisses, and that the source premiss terms are first out because they
are first in. However this seems spurious; the relevant orders are already specified
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in the materials, and postulating a mental process to simply maintain an already
existent external order multiplies entities unnecessarily. Subjects may report terms
in a specific order because they read them off from the premisses when they report
a conclusion. This is not to say that FIFO stores don't exist, simply that this
type of task tells us nothing about them.
As far as it goes, the memory evidence from the Levy (1984) experiment is at
least as compatible with the source-founding account as it is with Mental Models.
Single premiss presentation caused sufficient memory load that performance was
correlated with memory span in ba/cb alone, suggesting that in this Figure it
was necessary to maintain the first premiss in memory, so that processing of the
problem could be begun with the second premiss. Certainly this is compatible
with the Mental Models account, but it is also what would be expected if it was
necessary to start processing with the source premiss. The theories predict differ¬
ent results on the single-premiss task in the symmetric Figures: Mental Models
would expect a preponderance of ac conclusions, but no memory load problems,
whereas source founding would expect no preponderance of ac conclusions but
a small memory load problem. The evidence is that there was no increase in
the number of ac conclusions, but also no evidence for a memory load problem.
The sensitivity of this experiment was lamentably low, owing to the small sample
sizes and between-subjects design, so the evidence cannot conclusively distinguish
between the hypotheses.
It would be very easy to adapt Mental Models theory to account for the re¬
sults of the present study; to do so would simply make it completely isomorphic
with the IIA, and consequently make it lose most of its distinctive empirical con¬
sequences. Indeed, the fatal weakness of Mental Models theory would appear to
be that its empirical consequences almost all derive from assumptions about the
way the theory is implemented, whereas in the present study the main thrust is
to show that robust effects such as the Figural Effect are likely to occur in many
implementationally distinct systems, for logical reasons. So while we might con¬
clude that the source/conditional distinction constrains the class of algorithms
which might underlie human performance on these tasks, as we have seen from
Chapter 3 the form of any intermediate representations (mental imagery, Men¬
tal Models or sentential representations) remains completely unconstrained. As
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a consequence, tasks which merely relate premisses to conclusions, such as the
ones described here and in most of the relevant literature, will not provide much
information about the implementation of reasoning.
The importance of this point lies in the fact that where the appropriate infor¬
mation has been gathered, as it has been by Ford (1994), there is ample evidence
for the diversity of individual phenomenology, and hence arguably a diversity of
implementations, in the syllogistic reasoning task. That such a range of reasoning
styles can realistically be expected in any experimental sample is evidence that
any robust psychological effects such as the Figural Effect must be explained by
relatively high-order invariants of human reasoning. The ins and outs of memory
stores are likely to vary widely with representational formats, especially in view
of Baddeley's (1986) contention that separate systems underlie spatial/imagistic
and linguistic processing modes, so it seems unlikely a priori that they would
accidentally coincide to produce any highly robust overall effect. The advantage
of the source-founding account of term order effects is that it explains why phe-
nomenologically different reasoning methods can give rise to the same results. It
also indicates that further investigation requires much richer data than premiss-
to-conclusion mappings—data from phenomenology and learning, and analysis in
terms of individual differences, are required to resolve implementational issues.
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A.l The Graphical Method
Table A.l shows the full set of topologically distinct registration diagrams for the
Graphical Individual Identification Algorithm (see Section 3.3.1). These diagrams
are used as the basis for the definition of a set of equivalence classes of syllogisms
(problem types), which abstract over premiss order and the valid conversion of I
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Figure A.l: The full set of topologically distinct registration diagrams. Those on
the left have valid individuals; those on the right do not. The unlabelled circles
can represent either A or C, depending on the premisses.
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A.2 The prolog program
This section presents a complete prolog syllogism solution program, based on the
Individual Identification code described in Chapter 3. The top-level predicates are
standard/6 and individual/6, which produce quantified and individual conclu¬
sions respectively. Thus a goal like
?- standard(all(a.b).all(b,c).Terms,Cone.Syllno.Source) .
will instantiate Cone as each valid quantified conclusion for the premisses in turn.
Replacing standard with individual in this goal will produce valid individual
conclusions as before.
The program does full syntax checking for premisses, using the predicate
gensyll/4, and as a side-effect this ensures that premisses become instantiated—
this means that the program can systematically produce all Standard conclusions
to all problems in one run. To do this, use a top-level goal like
?- standard(Premissl,Premiss2,[a,b,c],Cone.Syllno.Source) .
Note that if premisses are to be left uninstantiated like this, the terms of the prob¬
lem must be specified. The main function of gensyll/4 is to produce codings for
data scoring (represented in compound form by Syllno); however, the quantified
conclusions code depends on gensyll/4 to identify the middle term if terms are
not specified.
standard/6 acts just like individual/6 up to the unif ication_test/3 goal,
where instead of returning the necessary individual as the conclusion, it proceeds
to convert it into a valid quantified conclusion. First, the middle term feature is
removed from Neclnd to give EndTerms. Then getconc/3 selects a positive end
term feature for the subject of the conclusion, and performs another unification
test with the maximal model of the source premiss, to see if a universal conclusion
is warranted. Failure here forces backtracking to produce a particular conclusion.
The program produces all valid conclusions for a given pair of premisses, and
if possible their end-term order preserves the term order in the individual due
to source-founding. However, backtracking will also produce the "counterfigural"
conclusions, since the program is a complete decision procedure for the syllogism.
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/* Syllogism Solver */
/* P Yule 1995 */
/* Quantified and Individual conclusions */
/* Premiss representations */
characteristic(all(A,B),[[-A,-B],[-A,+B],[+A,+B]]-[[+A,+B]] ).
characteristic(some(A,B),[[-A,-B],[~A,+B],[+A,-B],[+A,+B]]-[[+A,+B]]).
characteristic(none(A,B), [[-A,-B],[-A.+B],[+A,-B]]- [[+A,-B],[-A,+B]]) .
characteristic(somenot(A,B),[[-A,-B],[-A,+B],[+A,-B],[+A,+B]] -[[+A,-B]]).
/*************************************************/



































/* Syllogism generation, syntax checking */














/* Unification test code */
unification_test(I,Max,K)
bagof(Unified,J"(member(J,Max).unify(I,J.Unified)),[K]).





























In the following tables, unique source premisses and conclusions founded on them
are indicated by bold. Other valid conclusions are in plain text, while invalid
conclusions are indicated by italics. Data are from the Individuals Task (N=22)
and Durham Standard Task (N=24) experiments. Tables are organised around the
equivalence classes defined by the set of distinct registration diagrams (Figure A.l).







ABC (1) CBA (9)
ACB (1) BCA (1)
BAC (8)
NVC (0) NVC (1)
all A C (21) some C A (1)
all C A (1)
NVC (1)
all A C (2) all C A (16)
NVC (2)




BAC (15) BCA (5)
ACB (1)
NVC (1)
some A C (4) all C A (1)
all A C (9)
NVC (3)























ABC (17) BCA (4) BAC (9)




some A C (18) some C A (2)
NVC (1)
some A C (6) some C A (16)
all A C (1)
NVC (0)














BA-C (1) B-CA (1)
NVC (0)





-ABC (1) CB-A (12)
B-AC (1) BC-A (2)
NVC (2)









none A C (2) none C A (19)
NVC (2)
Table B.4: Conclusions in both Tasks for vnl problems. Each premiss is source




-ABC (2) BC-A (11)
B-AC (2) CB-A (1)
CA-B (1) A-B-C (1)
NVC (3)
none A C (6) none C A (3)



















none A C (6) somenot C A (1)






AC-B (l) BC-A (1)
NVC (0)
somenot A C (1)
none A C (13)
NVC (6)
none C A (1)















B-A-C (1) CBA (1)
NVC (2)
none A C (1) somenot C A (10)




-ABC (1) CB-A (14)
-AB-C (1) -CB-A (1)
NVC (3)
none A C (5) somenot C A (3)











none A C (4) somenot C A (4)







somenot A C (5) none C A (1)








somenot A C (1) none C A (3)






somenot A C (2) none C A (3)








somenot A C (2) some C A (1)
none A C (1) none C A (1)
NVC (16)
Table B.6: Conclusions in both Tasks for vn3 problems. 11 Individuals Task

















somenot A C (16)
some A C (1)
NVC (6)
somenot C A (16)
some C A (1)
NVC (6)
Table B.7: Conclusions in both Tasks for vn4 problems.
All A B
Somenot C B





somenot A C (1) somenot C A (7)
some A C (1) some C A (2)




A-B-C (5) -C-BA (2)
ABC (1) CB-A (2)
B-AC (1) BC-A (1)
-A-C-B (1) -C-B-A (1)
NVC (7)
somenot A C (4) somenot C A (2)
some A C (1) some C A (2)
NVC (13)
Table B.8: Conclusions in both Tasks for vn5 problems.
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B.2 Problems with Valid U-Conclusions
None A B
None B C
-AB-C (1) B-C-A (6)


















B-A-C (6) B-C-A (1)
-CB-A (1)
A-B-C (1) CA-B (1)
NVC (10)
none A C (1) none C A (3)







-BAC (1) CA-B (1)
-B-A-C (1)
NVC (4)
none A C (3) none C A (1)
NVC (17)



















none C A (1)















somenot A C (1)
NVC (22)
Table B.10: Conclusions in both Tasks for vu2 problems. Standard Task has NVC.
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3 Problems with No Valid Conclusion
All A B
All C B




all A C (10) all C A (2)
some A C (3) some C A (1)
NVC (7)
Table B.ll: Conclusions in both Tasks for npl problems.
All A B
Some B C
ABC (10) CAB (2)
BAC (1)
NVC (9)




ABC (2) CBA (1)
ACB (1) CAB (1)
BAC (1)
NVC (16)
some A C (4) some C A (8)




ACB (4) CBA (4)
BAC (2) BCA (1)
NVC (11)




ABC (2) CBA (1)
BAC (1) CAB (2)
NVC (15)
some A C (8) some C A (8)
NVC (7)



















ABC (1) CBA (1)
BAC (1) BCA (1)
NVC (18)




BAC (4) CBA (1)
CAB (1)
NVC (16)
some A C (3)
NVC (21)







some A C (1)




ACB (1) CB-A (11)
NVC (9)
none A C (1) some C A (1)
somenot C A (15)
NVC (4)



















somenot A C (6) somenot C A (1)
some A C (3)
NVC (12)
some A C (1) some C A (2)
somenot C A (6)
NVC (12)































somenot A C (1)
NVC (22)







some A C (2)




ABC (1) CB-A (1)
NVC (19)
















somenot A C (1) somenot C A (1)
NVC (19)




A-BC (I) CA-B (1)
AB-C (1) B-CA (1)
B-A-C (1) C-A-B (1)
NYC (16)







some A C (1)




-BAC (1) CA-B (1)
B-A-C (2) B-C-A (1)
NVC (17)




-AB-C (1) BC-A (1)
B-A-C (1)
NVC (19)
somenot C A (3)
NVC (21)
Table B.18: Conclusions in both Tasks for nn5 problems.
Somenot A B Somenot B A
Somenot C B Somenot B C
A-BC (1) CA-B (1) BAC (1)
B-C-A (1) B-A-C (1)
NVC (19) NVC (20)
somenot C A (1) somenot A C (1)
NVC (22) NVC (21)
Table B.19: Conclusions in both Tasks for nn6 and nn8 problems.
Somenot A B
Somenot B C
B-A-C (1) CA-B (1)
NVC (20)
some A C (1)




B-A-C (1) BC-A (1)
CA-B (1)
NVC (19)
somenot C A (2)
NVC (21)







somenot A C (1)
NYC (21)
Table B.21: Conclusions in both Tasks for nn8 problems.
112
